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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the district court properly afforded appellant sufficient opportunity to 
conduct discovery to oppose respondents' motion for summary judgment where: (1) discovery 
was unnecessary because appellant's claims fail as a matter of law under this Court's recent 
decision in Trotter; (2) respondents' motion to dismiss was treated as a motion for summary 
judgment solely because of affidavits submitted by appellant; (3) appellant failed to satisfy 
LR.C.P. 56(£)'s requirements for continuance of a summary judgment motion hearing; and (4) 
appellant had months to conduct discovery and oppose summary judgment. 
II. Whether the district court properly awarded summary judgment to respondents 
where: (1) appellant's claims fail as a matter of law under this Court's recent Trotter decision; 
and (2) it was undisputed, based on public records subject to judicial notice, that respondents 
complied with all requirements for non-judicial foreclosure under I.C. §§ 45-1505 and 45-1506. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
Although she admits defaulting on her residential mortgage loan, plaintiff/appellant 
Leslie Jensen Edwards ("Edwards") brought this lawsuit in an attempt to prevent non-judicial 
foreclosure under I.C. § 45-1505. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Edwards filed her complaint pro se on April 1, 2010, in the Kootenai County District 
Court. (Clerk's Record on Appeal ("R._") at 1-4.) Named as defendants were respondents 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), Quality Loan Services ("QLS"), and 
Pioneer Lender Trustee Services, LLC ("Pioneer"), as well as Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB and 
Aurora Loan Services. (R.1) Seeking to stop the non-judicial sale scheduled for April 8, 2010, 
Edwards asserted two purported causes of action: (1) temporary and permanent injunction 
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(Count I); and (2) declaratory judgment (Count II). (R.8-18.) While far from a model of clarity, 
the gravamen of Edwards' complaint appeared to be that no defendant had "standing" to 
foreclose under Edwards' deed of trust because no defendant owned the promissory note, which 
purportedly had been sold or securitized. (R.4-7.) 
On April 27, 2010, all defendants jointly filed a motion under I.R.C.P 12(b)(6) to dismiss 
the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against any defendant. 
(R.32.) The next day, counsel filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Edwards. (Trial Court 
Docket Sheet ("D._") 1.) Although the district court previously had denied Edwards' motion for 
a temporary restraining order (R.29, R.31), on May 5, 2010, defendants nevertheless stipulated 
with Edwards to entry of an order postponing the foreclosure sale "until after the Court rules on 
Defendant's [sic] motion to dismiss." (R.35. See also Transcript on Appeal ("T. ") 8-9, 16.) In 
addition, at Edwards' request, on May 6, 2010, defendants stipulated to continue the motion to 
dismiss hearing. (D.2.) 
On May 14,2010, Edwards, through her new counsel, responded to the motion to dismiss 
with a motion to amend the complaint. (R.37.) Over defendants' objection (R.65), on May 28, 
2010, the district court allowed Edwards to amend her complaint and postponed the hearing on 
defendants' motion to dismiss. (R.96; T.15-16.) In large part, the amended complaint simply 
repeated the initial pro se pleading's conclusory allegations that no defendant had "standing" to 
foreclose because none of them owned the promissory note. (R.103-108.) The amended 
complaint did not alter the two purported causes of action or the requested relief. (R.l 08-201.) 
The only differences were that Edwards: (1) dropped claims against defendants Lehman Brothers 
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Bank, FSB 1 and Aurora Loan Services (R.I0I-103); and (2) added speculative and conclusory 
allegations (not causes of action) that the foreclosure was "fraudulent" because of purported 
improprieties in documents recorded in the land records (R.l 06-1 08) and the supposed 
bankruptcy of the original lender, Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB. (R.I03,106.) 
On July 6, 2010, the remaining defendants-respondents MERS, Pioneer, and QLS-
again moved to dismiss the amended complaint under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). (R.I26; see also R.32; 
R.65.) In addition, to rebut the speculative and conclusory allegations raised by Edwards in her 
amended complaint, respondents asked the district court to take judicial notice of the following 
public documents: (1) Kootenai County land records relating to Edwards' loan and foreclosure; 
(2) United States Bankruptcy Court and Federal Reserve Board records relating to Lehman 
Brothers Holdings, Inc.'s bankruptcy filing, and Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB's name change to 
Aurora Bank, FSB; and (3) Idaho Secretary of State licensing records relating to QLS and 
Pioneer. (R.I23; D.3.) 
Edwards responded to respondents' motion to dismiss by filing: (1) two separate requests 
to convert respondents' motion to a motion for summary judgment and to continue the hearing to 
allow discovery (R.128, R.I41); (2) an objection to judicial notice of public records submitted by 
defendants (R.143; 0.4); and (3) an affidavit of a purported expert forensic loan examiner, 
Charles Homer. (T.24; D.4.) On August 9, 2010, in response to Edwards' attempt to convert the 
motion to summary judgment and objection to judicial notice, defendants submitted the 
supplemental affidavit of their trial counsel, Holger Uhl, attesting that the public records 
submitted by respondents were true and correct copies obtained by Uhl. (D.4.) On August 13, 
I In her appeal brief, Edwards incorrectly refers to "Lehman Brothers Bank" as an "Appellee." 
(Appellant's Br. at 7.) Given that Edwards dropped Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB as a defendant 
when she amended her complaint, Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, nlk/a Aurora Bank, FSB, is not 
properly a party to this appeal. 
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2010, Edwards moved to strike Uhl's affidavit, and the public records attached thereto, on the 
grounds that Uhl purportedly lacked personal knowledge and his testimony was inadmissible 
hearsay. (D.4.) 
A hearing took place on August 20, 2010 (T .19), after defendants once again 
accommodated Edwards' request for a postponement of the hearing previously scheduled for 
July 29, 2010. (D.4.) The district court concluded that Edwards failed to satisfy the 
requirements for a continuance for discovery under I.R.c.P. 56(f). (T.2l, T.29-30, T.32.) 
Nevertheless, the district court: (1) decided to treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for 
summary judgment; (2) postponed the summary judgment hearing to September 30, 2010; (3) 
allowed Edwards to pursue discovery in the interim; and (4) allowed Edwards to submit more 
affidavit testimony from purported expert loan forensic examiner Homer. (T.29, T.33, T.36.) 
The district court also indicated that it would hear and decide any motions to strike the Homer 
affidavit and/or the public records and Uhl affidavit in conjunction with summary judgment 
motion. (T.34, T.36.) 
On September 16, 2010, Edwards submitted a second affidavit from Homer. (D.4.) 
Defendants moved to strike the Homer affidavits on the grounds that, among other things, 
Homer was not qualified as an expert and his report consisted of improper legal conclusions. 
(R.145.) 
The motion for summary judgment and motions to strike were heard on September 30, 
2010. (T.38.) By written order dated November 16,2010, the district court granted defendants' 
motion for summary judgment. (R.154.) While it ostensibly treated the motion as one for 
summary judgment, the district court concluded that it could take judicial notice of the public 
records submitted by respondents (R.151) and that respondents were entitled to judgment as a 
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matter of law. (R.163.) Based on the undisputed public documents submitted by respondents, 
the district court found the following facts to be undisputed: (1) the original lender, Lehman 
Brothers Bank, FSB, had changed its name to Aurora Bank, FSB, and had not filed bankruptcy; 
(2) under Edwards' deed of trust, MERS was the beneficiary as the agent for Lehman Brothers 
Bank, FSB, nlkla Aurora Bank, FSB, and its successors and assigns; (3) Pioneer was the trustee; 
(4) QLS was the agent/attorney in fact for Pioneer; (5) MERS, acting through Pioneer and its 
agent QLS, had the authority to foreclose on behalf of Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, nlkla 
Aurora Bank, FSB, and its successors and assigns; and (6) respondents complied with all 
statutory recording and notice requirements for non-judicial foreclosure. (R.156-161.) The 
district court thus concluded that respondents had the authority to foreclose and had complied 
with all statutory prerequisites to non-judicial foreclosure. (R.l61-165.) The district court also 
denied Edwards' motion to strike the Uhl affidavit and objection to judicial notice of the public 
records, as well as respondents' motion to strike the Homer affidavit. (R.151-53.) 
On December 1, 2010, Edwards moved for reconsideration of the summary judgment 
order. (R.167.) After receiving additional briefing from the parties (R.175, R.185, D.5), but 
without oral argument (R.180), the district court issued a written order denying reconsideration 
on February 18,2011. (R.189.) 
Judgment was entered in favor of respondents on January 24, 2011. (R.169.) On March 
4, 2011, Edwards, through her trial counsel, filed a notice of appeal (R.198), though apparently 
she is now proceeding with the appeal pro se and looking for replacement counsel. (Appellant's 
Br. at 35.) Edwards filed her opening brief on November 16,2011. By order of this Court, dated 
December 29,2011, the due date for respondents' brief was stayed pending the Court's decision 
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in Trotter v. Bank of NY Mellon, appeal no. 38022-2011. Trotter was decided on March 23, 
2012. See Trotter v. Bank ofN Y Mellon, 275 P.3d 857 (Idaho 2012). 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. Edwards' Mortgage Loan 
On or about May 18, 2005, Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, lent Edwards $345,000, at a 6% 
interest rate, to refinance her existing residential mortgage loan with American Gold Mortgage 
Corporation. (R.124 - Ex. A p. 2; see also R.124 - Exs. J & L.) In return, Edwards executed a 
promissory note in favor of Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB. (Id.) In addition, to secure repayment 
of the note, Edwards executed a uniform Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac deed of trust on residential 
real property at 17287 West Summerfield Road, Post Falls, Idaho, 83854 in Kootenai County 
(the "Property"). (R.124 - Ex. A at p. 3.) The deed of trust identifies Edwards as "borrower;" 
Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB as "lender;" MERS as "beneficiary" in a representative capacity as 
"nominee" on behalf of the lender and its "successors and assigns;" and Alliance Title and 
Escrow ("Alliance") as "trustee." (Id. at pp. 2-3.) 
The deed of trust authorizes MERS to take all necessary actions on the lender's behalf, 
including foreclosure, discharge, or release of the security interest. (Id. at p. 4.) The deed of 
trust provides, in part: 
"MERS" is Mortgage Electronic Systems, Inc. MERS is a separate 
corporation that is acting solely as nominee for Lender and 
Lender's successors and assigns. MERS is the beneficiary under 
this Security Instrument. MERS is organized and existing under 
the laws of Delaware, and has an address and telephone number of 
P.O. Box 2026, Flint, MI, 48501-2026, tel. (888) 679-MERS. 
(Id. at p. 1 (emphasis added).) 
52114402.2 
The beneficiary of this Security Instrument is MERS (solely as 
nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) and the 
successors and assigns of MERS. This Security Instrument secures 
to Lender: (i) the repayment of the Loan, and renewals, extensions 
- 6 -
and modifications of the Note; and (ii) the performance of 
Borrower's covenants and agreements under this Security 
Instrument and the Note. For this purpose, Borrower irrevocably 
grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the 
[Property] .... 
... Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal 
title to the interests granted by borrower in this Security 
Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS 
(as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has 
the right: to exercise any or all of [Lender'sj interests, including, 
but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and 
to take any action required of Lender, including, but not limited 
to, releasing and canceling this Security Instrument. 
(Id. at pp. 2-3 (emphasis added).) 
The deed of trust also advised Edwards that "[t]he Note or a partial interest in the Note 
(together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one or more times without prior notice to 
Borrower." (Id. at p. 11 (emphasis added).) 
At closing, Edwards initialed each page of the deed of trust, including those pages 
referencing MERS, and signed the deed of trust, which was then acknowledged by a notary. (Id. 
at pp. 2-3, 14-15.) The deed of trust was then duly recorded in the Kootenai County land 
records on May 25, 2005. (Id. at p. 1.) 
With the loan from Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, Edwards refinanced here prior 
mortgage loan with American Gold Mortgage Corporation, dated October 24,2003. (R.124 - Ex. 
J at p. 2.) That prior loan was evidenced by a separate promissory note, as well as a deed of trust 
to the Property recorded in the Kootenai County land records on October 29,2003. (Id. at pp. 1-
3.) That prior deed of trust listed American Gold Mortgage Corporation as "lender;" MERS as 
"beneficiary" in a representative capacity as "nominee" on behalf of the lender and its 
"successors and assigns;" and Alliance as "trustee." (Id. at pp. 2-3.) Because the prior loan was 
paid off through the refinancing, MERS, in its capacity as beneficiary under the prior deed of 
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trust, executed a Substitution of Trustee, dated June 1, 2005, which replaced Alliance with 
Fidelity National Title Company ("Fidelity"). (R.124 - Ex. K.) Acting on behalf of MERS as 
beneficiary on behalf of American Gold Mortgage and its successors and assigns, Fidelity 
executed a Deed of Reconveyance, dated June 8, 2005, indicating that Edwards' prior loan "has 
been paid in full." (R.124 - Ex. L.) On June 21, 2005, Fidelity recorded both the Substitution of 
Trustee and the Deed of Reconveyance in the Kootenai County land records. (R.124 - Ex. K & 
L.) 
2. Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB's Name Change 
On April 27, 2009, Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, changed its name to Aurora Bank, FSB. 
(R.124 - Exs. F & G.) 
3. Edwards' Default and the Resulting Foreclosure 
Edwards does not dispute2 that she defaulted on her mortgage loan in August 2009, and 
has not made any payments since, despite continuing to occupy the Property. (R.124 - Ex. D.) 
As a result of Edwards' default, on or about November 30, 2009, MERS, as deed of trust 
beneficiary on behalf of the lender and its successors and assigns, executed an Appointment of 
Successor Trustee, replacing Alliance with Pioneer as trustee and QLS as attorney in fact for 
Pioneer. (R.124 - Ex. B.) The Appointment of Successor Trustee was recorded in the Kootenai 
County land records on December 3, 2009. (Id.) That same day, Pioneer, as trustee, and acting 
through its attorney in fact, QLS, recorded in the Kootenai County land records a Notice of 
Default and Election to Sell, which indicated that Edwards had been in default since August 
2009. (R.124 - Ex. D.) 
2 See number 22 of Plaintiffs Response QLS' First Set of Request for Admission, submitted to 
the district court on or about August 5, 2010, in connection with defendants' motion to compel 
discovery responses from plaintiff. (D.4.) See also Affidavit of Leslie Jensen Edwards, 
submitted to the district court on or about April 1, 2010. (D.l.) 
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On December 9, 2009, after the recording of the Notice of Default and Election to Sell, 
but more than 120 days before the trustee's sale, Pioneer, through QLS, sent to Edwards via 
registered or certified mail a Notice of Trustee's Sale stating that the Property would be sold at 
public auction on April 8, 2010. (R.124 - Ex. C.) In addition, personal service of the Notice of 
Trustee Sale was attempted, and the Notice was posted at the Property, on December 11, 19, and 
29,2009. (R.124 - Ex. C.) Further, the Notice of Trustee's Sale was published in the Coeur d' 
Alene Press, a print newspaper serving Kootenai County, for four consecutive weeks, beginning 
December 23, 2009, and ending January 13, 2010. (R.124 - Ex. C.) Affidavits of mailing, 
posting, and publication of the Notice of Trustee's Sale were recorded in the Kootenai County 
land records on or about February 10, 2010. (Id.) The sale did not take place on April 8, 2010 
because Edwards filed this lawsuit. 
4. MERS and the MERS® System 
a. Title Problems Prior to MERS 
At origination of a residential mortgage loan, a borrower executes a promissory note 
(obligating the borrower to repay the loan) and a separate security instrument (granting a security 
interest in the real estate as collateral in the event of default on the note). Cervantes v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011). Unlike the note, the 
security instrument-typically a mortgage or, as in this case, a deed of trust-is recorded in the 
county in which the property is located pursuant to state law. Id.; Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. 
Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 490-491 (Minn. 2009). 
After origination, lenders routinely sell mortgage loans on the secondary mortgage 
market and such loans may be sold several times in whole or in part or bundled into mortgage-
backed securities. Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1038-39; Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490. The lender that 
owns the note has the right to receive repayment of the underlying indebtedness and ultimately 
52114402.2 - 9 -
the sale proceeds in the event of a default and foreclosure of the security instrument. Cervantes, 
656 F.3d at 1038. In addition, the contractual right to service the loan for the lender routinely 
changes hands. Id. After origination, the loan "servicer" deals directly with the borrower and 
administers the loan (e.g., collects payments from the borrower, ensures that real estate taxes and 
insurance premiums are paid, and remits payments to the owner(s) of the note).3 Id. Pursuant to 
uee requirements for negotiable instruments, notes are negotiated either by indorsement and 
delivery, or in the event the note is bearer paper, just by delivery, Horvath, 641 F.3d at 621; 
Idaho Stat. §§ 28-3-201, 3-204, 3-205, while assignments of servicing rights typically occur by 
contract, see R.K. Arnold, supra, at 34. 
Transfers of notes and assignments of servicing rights are not susceptible to recording in 
county land records. See id. Historically, transfer (i.e., negotiation) of a note to a new lender 
often, but not always, was accompanied by a separate assignment of the trust deed (substituting a 
new beneficiary) that was recorded in the county land records. Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1039; 
Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490. But as secondary market transfers increased, "[t]his recording 
process became cumbersome to the mortgage industry," Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1039, because 
"multiple assignments of the security instrument commonly caused confusion, delays, and chain-
of-title problems," Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490. These problems were exacerbated in the 1980s 
due to the inability to obtain assignments, satisfactions, and reconveyances from collapsed 
S&LS.4 MERS was formed in the aftermath of the S&L crisis, Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490, to 
eliminate the foregoing title problems and inefficiencies, which adversely affected the residential 
3 See also R.K. Arnold, Yes, There Is Life On MERS, 11 PROB. & PROP. 32, 34 (1997). 
4 E.g., Jeffrey J. Miller, The Effect of the S&L Bailout on Title to Real Property, 5 PROB. & PROP. 
44, 47-49 (1991) (discussing various title-related issues with S&Ls in the 1980s); R.K. Arnold, 
supra, at 34 (discussing delays); see also Allen H. Jones, Setting the Record Straight on MERS, 
Mortg. Banking 34 (May 2011). 
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finance industry's ability to efficiently provide home financing to consumers. Id; Cervantes, 656 
F.3dat 1039. 
h. Role and Benefit of MERS 
MERS does not originate, lend, service, or invest in home loans. Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 
1039-40. Instead, MERS serves two primary functions for the residential lending industry. 
First, MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., operates the MERS® System, a private electronic database 
that tracks transfers of promissory notes (and changes in loan servicers), Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 
1038, by a Mortgage Identification Number ("MIN") assigned to each loan, Jackson, 770 
N.W.2d at 490-91.5 The shareholders ofMERSCORP and the members of the MERS® System 
include lenders who originate, invest in, or service loans, Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1039 (citing 
Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490-91), including government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, see MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E. 2d 81,83 n.2 (N.Y. 2006). Borrowers 
can learn the identity of the lender who owns their note (referred to on the MIN Summary as the 
"investor") and the servicer by calling the toll-free number listed in the trust deed (or mortgage), 
see, e.g., R.124 - Ex. A. (Edwards' deed of trust), or by accessing the MERS website, 
www.mersinc.org. 6 Prior to MERS, there was no system for tracking such interests, which are 
not reflected in county land records. See R.K. Arnold, supra, at 34. 
Second, and wholly distinct from the MERS® System database, MERSCORP's 
subsidiary, Appellee MERS, acts as the "beneficiary" in the trust deed (or mortgagee in 
mortgage) as the agent (i. e. nominee) of the lender that owns the note and the lender's successors 
5 See R.K. Arnold, supra, at 34. 
6 Although the disclosure of the note owner is optional, 97% of the over 3,000 MERS members 
disclose their identity. E.g., Problems in Mortgage Servicing From Modification to Foreclosure: 
Hearing Before the Sub. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111 th Congo (Nov. 16, 
2010) (statement ofR.K. Arnold, President and CEO, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, 
Inc.), http://banking.senate.gov. 
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and assigns. Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1040; see, e.g., R.124 - Ex. A. (Edwards' deed of trust). 
This is accomplished at origination, when the borrower, lender, and MERS all agree in the deed 
of trust (or mortgage)-including uniform deeds of trust (and mortgages) drafted by Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac-that MERS will serve this role. See, e.g., R.l24 - Ex. A. (Edwards' deed of 
trust). These security instruments are recorded in the public land records identifying MERS as 
the holder oflegal and record title to the security interest. Jackson, 770 N. W.2d at 490; see, e.g., 
R.124 - Ex. A. (Edwards' deed of trust as recorded in Kootenai County land records). 
With MERS' two distinct functions, subsequent transfers of notes (and assignments of 
servicing rights) are tracked in the MERS database, but are not recorded in the public land 
records, Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1040, because notes are not susceptible to recordation, see KK. 
Arnold, supra, at 34. When a note is transferred-i.e., negotiated (by endorsement and/or 
delivery) to a new lender-there is no separate assignment of the trust deed because there is no 
change in the beneficiary (or mortgagee) or holder of legal and record title. Id; Jackson, 770 
N.W.2d at 491 & n.2. Rather, MERS remains the trust deed beneficiary in the public land 
records on behalf of the new lender. Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1040. These services MERS 
provides benefit lenders, borrowers, the title industry, and local governments in numerous ways, 
including, but not limited to: providing a source for information (e.g., promissory note transfers 
and loan ownership) not otherwise available; reducing recording errors and delays and the 
resulting uncertainty and title problems; and increasing efficiency and reducing costs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews for abuse of discretion a district court's decision on a request under 
I.R.C.P. 56(f) to allow time for discovery to oppose a summary judgment motion. See Carnell v. 
Barker Mgmt., Inc., 48 P.3d 651, 658 (Idaho 2002) (citations omitted). "In determining whether 
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a trial court abused its discretion this Court considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
The Court reviews de novo a district court's decision to grant a motion for summary 
judgment, applying the same standard as the district court. See Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 96 
P.3d 623, 626 (Idaho 2004). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to jUdgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P. 
56( c). The party opposing the motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that 
party's pleadings, but that party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." LR.C.P. 56(e). Thus, 
"while reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, the non-moving 
party cannot rest upon mere speculation," Finholt v. Cresto, 155 P.3d 695, 698 (Idaho 2007), or 
"conclusory assertions," Partout v. Harper, 183 P.3d 771, 776 (2008). "A mere scintilla of 
evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue." Ryan v. Beisner, 844 P.2d 24, 25 (Idaho 1992) 
(citations omitted). "[T]he moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails 
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case 
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Partout, 183 P.3d at 776 (citation 
omitted). 
Applying these familiar standards, this Court should affirm the district court's decision in 
all respects. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE OF PUBLIC 
RECORDS AND DISMISSED EDWARDS' COMPLAINT WITHOUT 
EXTENSIVE DELAY FOR UNNECESSARY DISCOVERY 
Edwards argues that the district court improperly converted respondents' motion to 
dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, and then accepted inadmissible evidence from 
respondents, while depriving Edwards of discovery necessary to oppose respondents' motion. 
(Appellant's Br. at 9-13,34-35.) Nothing could be further from the truth. 
A. Trotter Confirms that Discovery Was Unnecessary 
To begin with, Edwards only vaguely argued below, and repeats with the same 
imprecision here on appeal, that she was entitled to undefined discovery that she believes would 
enable her to uncover respondents' purported lack of "standing" to foreclose. (T.31; see also 
R.128, R.141, R.167.) As best as MERS can tell, Edwards wants discovery on ownership of her 
promissory note because, in her view, lack of ownership of the note means lack of standing to 
foreclose. But such "standing" or "note ownership" discovery was irrelevant and unnecessary 
for two reasons. First, in its recent Trotter decision, this Court held, as a matter of law, that 
there is no requirement of "standing"-i.e., no obligation to show an ownership interest in the 
note-to commence non-judicial foreclosure. See Trotter, 275 P.3d 857 (discussed infra § III.) 
Edwards even concedes that standing presents "questions oflaw" for the court. (Appellant's Br. 
at 14.) Second, the indisputable public records, including the deed of trust Edwards signed in 
return for $345,000, established as a matter of law that MERS, as beneficiary on behalf of the 
lender that owns the note, had explicit authority to appoint Pioneer as successor trustee and direct 
Pioneer to foreclose on behalf of the note owner. (See supra § IILA.) In sum, the discovery 
sought by Edwards was irrelevant. 
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B. Respondents' Motion Was Converted to Summary Judgment Because of 
Edwards' Affidavits 
Furthermore, it was Edwards, not respondents, who (1) twice asked the district court to 
covert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment (R.l28, R.141, T.22) and (2) 
submitted evidence outside the pleadings-i.e., two purported expert affidavits (T.24; D.4)-that 
led the district court to ostensibly treat the motion as one for summary judgment. (T.29.) 
Respondents maintain, as they did below (R.145), that the district court erred in considering the 
affidavits of Edwards' purported expert forensic loan examiner Charles Homer, on the grounds 
that, among other things: (1) Homer was not qualified as a expert and his affidavits contained 
inadmissible legal opinions;7 and (2) the Federal Trade Commission has cautioned that such 
forensic loan audits are consumer scams.8 But leaving that issue aside, it is clear that it was the 
Homer affidavits submitted by Edwards, not anything submitted by respondents, that were 
outside the pleadings and led the district court to treat respondents' motion as one for summary 
judgment. 
Indeed, the district court correctly took judicial notice, under LR.E. 201, of the "public 
records of Kootenai County [], the Idaho Secretary of State, the Federal Reserve Board, and the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, sources whose accuracy 
7 See Nationwide Transp. Fin. v. Cass Info. Sys., Inc., 523 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(expert legal opinions are inadmissible and improper because interpretation of the law is 
exclusively within the province of the court). 
8 "Fraudulent foreclosure 'rescue' professionals use half-truths and outright lies to sell services 
that promise relief to homeowners in distress .... [T]he latest foreclosure rescue scam to exploit 
financially strapped homeowners pitches forensic mortgage loan audits. In exchange for an 
upfront fee of several hundred dollars, so-called forensic loan auditors ... offer to review your 
mortgage loan documents to determine whether your lender complied with state and federal 
mortgage lending laws. The 'auditors' say you can use the audit report to avoid foreclosure, 
accelerate the loan modification process, reduce your loan principal, or even cancel your loan." 
FTC Consumer Alert (March 2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/eduipubs/consumerialerts/altI77.shtm 
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cannot reasonably be questioned." (R.151.) It is well-settled that a court may take judicial 
notice of such public records in deciding a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dismiss, without converting 
the motion to one for summary judgment.9 See MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 
504 (9th Cir. 1986) ("we may take judicial notice of matters of public record outside the 
pleadings"). Thus, it was the Homer affidavits submitted by Edwards, not the public records 
submitted by respondents, that must have led the district court to treat the motion as a summary 
judgment motion. Given that it was Edwards who requested that the motion be converted to 
summary judgment, based on extra-pleading evidence (expert affidavits) that she alone 
submitted, she should not be heard now to argue that the motion was improperly converted 
without allowing her time for discovery. 
Edwards also argues that the district court improperly accepted hearsay testimony from 
respondents' trial counsel, Holger Uhl, and she makes the speculative argument that the public 
records attached to Uhl's affidavit "are most probably false, inaccurate, and grossly negligent." 
(Appellant's Br. at 34-35 (emphasis added).) These arguments lack merit. In his affidavit, Uhl 
merely attached the public records and attested, based on his personal knowledge, that the 
records were true and correct copies that he himself obtained. (D.4 - Supplemental Affidavit of 
Holger Ulh, dated August 9, 2010.) As the district court correctly concluded, not only does 
Uhl's affidavit satisfy the personal knowledge requirement of LR.E. 602, it also meets hearsay 
exceptions under I.R.E. 803(6) ("records of regularly conducted activity"), 803(8) ("public 
records and reports"), and 803(14) and (15) ("documents affecting interests in property"). 
9 See also 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Pro. § 1357 (3d ed. 1998) 
("items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record 
of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is unquestioned; these 
items may be considered by the district judge without converting the motion into one for 
summary judgment"). 
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Edwards' self-serving conjecture about purported fraudulent, without more, is insufficient to cast 
doubt on the veracity of these public records. See Hien Phan v. Bank of N. Y, --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 
2012 WL 1222572, at *7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10,2012) (rejecting as baseless the "bald assertion that 
the Note and other documents in the record are not authentic," "bare allegations that ... inclusion 
of MERS as beneficiary in Deed of Trust and the appointment of successor trustee were 
somehow 'fraudulent,'" and "speculative assertion that certain documents in the record are 
signed by individuals lacking authority"). 
C. Edwards Failed to Comply With Rule 56(0 
In any event, Edwards failed to comply with Rule 56(f)'s prerequisites for postponing 
summary judgment and allowing discovery. Rule 56(f) gives the district court discretion to 
continue the hearing and allow discovery to oppose a summary judgment motion "[ s ]hould it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated 
present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition .... " LR.C.P. 56(f) (emphasis 
added). A continuance should not be granted unless the movant actually submits an affidavit as 
required by Rule 56(f). See Golay v. Loomis, 797 P.2d 95, 97, 99 (Idaho 1990) (district court 
acted within its discretion to deny continuance where moving party did not submit required Rule 
56(f) affidavit); Prather v. Indus. Inv. Corp., 429 P.2d 414, 415 (Idaho 1967) (district court acted 
within its discretion in denying Rule 56(f) motion where movant did not "present an affidavit 
containing reasons ... why he was then unable to state 'affidavit facts essential to justify his 
position''') (citations omitted). 
In addition, any Rule 56(f) affidavit must clearly articulate the specific reasons for the 
continuance and the relevant discovery needed to oppose the motion. See Jenkins v. Boise 
Cascade Corp., 108 P.3d 380,386 (Idaho 2005) (affirming denial of Rule 56(f) motion that "did 
not specify what discovery was needed" and "did not set forth how the evidence he expected to 
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gather through further discovery would be relevant to preclude summary judgment"); Taylor v. 
AlA Services Corp., 261 P.3d 829, 849 (Idaho 2011) (affirming denial of 56(f) motion when the 
request was "based on mere speculation and on presumptions unsupported by fact or law ... 
Plaintiff has provided the Court with no reasonable basis to believe additional discovery will 
produce new or relevant information not previously disclosed .... "). 
Here, although Edwards filed two motions for a continuance (R.128, R.141), she never 
submitted any Rule 56(f) "affidavit," much less explained with the required specificity the 
particular discovery she purportedly needed to respond to respondents' motion. At the hearing 
on Edwards' motions for a continuance, the district court correctly explained to Edwards' 
counsel: 
Rule 56( f) does not stand for the proposition [that] if this becomes 
a summary judgment [motion] ... [Edwards] gets to complete 
discovery prior to the hearing. [Rule 56(f)] allows me upon a good 
showing ... to allow certain [discovery] to meet ... the summary 
judgment motion, but not to engage in just overall or incomplete 
discovery. So what exactly is it [Edwards] need to complete to 
meet the Motion for Summary Judgment? 
(T.29.) But Edwards failed to articulate specifically any meaningful discovery she needed in 
order to respond to respondents' motion. 
D. Edwards Was Afforded Sufficient Opportunity to Oppose the Motion 
Edwards takes isolated snippets of the district court's transcript out of context in a 
misleading attempt to (incorrectly) paint the district court as depriving her of the opportunity to 
oppose respondents' dispositive motion. (Appellant's Br. at 10.) In reality, however, Edwards 
was not denied sufficient time to prepare her case or to make arguments. 
Edwards filed this lawsuit on April 1, 2010 (R.1), some seven months before it was 
dismissed on November 16, 2010. (R.147.) While the case was originally commenced by 
Edwards pro se, she had counsel by at least April 28, 2010. (D.l.) What is more, the hearing on 
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Respondents' motion to dismiss (originally filed on April 27, 2010) was delayed at least four 
times before it was ultimately heard on September 30, 2010. The hearing was delayed once 
because Edwards moved to amend her complaint. (T.l6; R.37.) It was delayed twice more (on 
May 6 and July 28, 2010) because respondents consented to a postponement of the hearing at 
Edwards' request. (D.2, DA.) And, in response to Edwards' Rule 56(0 motion, the district court 
again postponed the hearing from August 20, 2009 until September 30, 2009, and told Edwards 
she could engage in discovery in the interim. (T.32, T.36, T.38.) If that were not enough, the 
district court accepted and considered (improperly in respondents' view) two affidavits from 
Edwards' purported expert forensic loan examiner, Charles Horner. (T.l53.) And, when 
Edwards finally got around to actually serving discovery in late August 2010, MERS and the 
other respondents properly and fully responded. (D.5 - Notices of Compliance, filed Sept. 29, 
2010.) 
Simply put, Edwards was afforded plenty of opportunity to conduct discovery and 
present arguments in opposition to respondents' dispositive motion. Her arguments to the 
contrary are baseless and should be rejected. 
E. The Authority Cited by Edwards Is Inapposite 
In an apparent attempt to prejudice respondents with this Court, Edwards cites two cases 
from other jurisdictions for the sweeping and unfounded proposition that every entity associated 
with the lending industry is part of some massive conspiracy to deprive plaintiff borrowers of 
legitimate discovery. (Appellant's Br. at 11-12.) Of course, neither case is even close to 
germane to this appeal. 
Neither case involved MERS or any other appellee, much less standing or authority to 
initiate non-judicial foreclosure, or even a Rule 56(0 motion to continue a motion for summary 
judgment for discovery purposes. In re Wilson, No. 07-11862 (Bankr. E.D. La. Apr. 7, 2011) 
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involved "contentious discovery" with "responses, oppositions and replies" to ten discovery 
motions, id. at *14, in a lawsuit about whether a lender processing service adequately tracked 
mortgage payments and verified information in affidavits before signing them, id. at 18-20. 
Phillips v. Us. Bank NA, No. ll-CV-00504 (Ga. Super. Ct. Nov. 2,2011), is a Georgia trial 
court denial of a motion to dismiss by a defendant bank who apparently had not provided 
plaintiff with the reason he was denied a modification under the federal HAMP program. Any 
conduct of the particular defendants in In re Wilson or Phillips, or any frustration of the judges 
with those defendants, is not applicable to, or justifiably directed against, MERS or any other 
respondents, who fully responded to Edwards' discovery and acted within their rights in filing a 
threshold Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dismiss in this case. 
For all the foregoing reasons, the district court properly took judicial notice of public 
records, afforded Edwards sufficient time to oppose the motion, and then decided the motion 
without extensive delay for meaningless discovery. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT RESPONDENTS 
HAD "STANDING" TO FORECLOSE NON-JUDICIALLY UNDER IDAHO 
CODE §§ 45-1505 AND 45-1506 
A. Respondents Were Not Required to Establish Note Ownership 
Edwards argues, as she did below, that respondents lacked "standing" to foreclose on the 
deed of trust because no appellee "owned" the promissory note evidencing the underlying debt. 
(See Appellant's Br. at 14-22, 28-30.) Edwards standing or "show me the note" theory is 
incorrect as a matter of law. Indeed, this Court expressly rejected the exact same theory in a 
decision issued since the district court dismissed Edwards' complaint. See Trotter, 275 P.3d 857. 
In Trotter, the borrower, like Edwards, executed a standardized deed of trust naming 
MERS as "beneficiary" on behalf of the originating lender and its successors and assigns. Id. at 
*3. After the borrower defaulted on the loan, MERS assigned the deed of trust to another lender, 
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the lender then appointed a successor trustee, and the successor trustee initiated non-judicial 
foreclosure under Idaho Code § 45-1505. Id. Like Edwards, the borrower sued the lender, 
MERS and the trustee, asserting claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, in an effort to 
prevent foreclosure. Id. at *3-4. Like Edwards, the borrower asserted that none of the 
defendants had "standing" to foreclose because none of them had established ownership of the 
promissory note memorializing the underlying debt. Id. Defendants moved to dismiss, and the 
district court granted their motion. Id. at *4. 
On appeal, this Court affirmed, "hold[ing] that, pursuant to I.C. § 45-1505, a trustee may 
initiate nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on a deed of trust without first proving ownership 
of the underlying note or demonstrating that the deed of trust beneficiary has requested or 
authorized the trustee to initiate those proceedings. Id. at *5 (emphasis added). In other words, 
"there is no statutory requirement [under § 45-1505] for the trustee to prove standing before 
initiating a nonjudicial foreclosure on a deed of trust. ... " Id. The Court explained: "fNJothing in 
the text of the statute can reasonably be read to require the trustee to prove it has 'standing' 
before foreclosing. Instead, the plain language of the statute makes it clear that the trustee may 
foreclose on a deed of trust if it complies with the requirements contained within the Act." Id. 
(emphasis added). Because there was no dispute that the defendants had complied with all the 
requirements for non-judicial foreclosure under the statute, the Court affirmed the district court's 
dismissal of the borrower's complaint. Id. 
Edwards contends that there is "not yet controlling precedent in Idaho" (Appellant's Br. 
at 22), and that two decisions by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho 
constitute the "most persuasive case law relating to this appeal" (id. at 14) and "represent the 
current state of the law in Idaho." (Id. at 16.) Of course, Edwards filed her appeal brief before 
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Trotter, which now represents the "controlling precedent in Idaho" she was looking for. 
Moreover, Trotter expressly rejected reliance on the same two bankruptcy cases-In re Wilhelm 
and In re Sheridan. Trotter described those bankruptcy cases as "relat[ing] to standing in 
bankruptcy proceedings and whether MERS met the statutory, constitutional, and prudential 
requirements to bring a motion in a bankruptcy court." Id. Trotter then explained that there are 
no such standing requirements for non-judicial foreclosure in Idaho: 
While it is true that a party must have standing before it may 
invoke the jurisdiction of a court, the [non-judicial] foreclosure 
process in [Idaho Code § 45-1505] is not a judicial proceeding. 
Instead, "the procedures to foreclose on trust deeds outside of the 
judicial process provide the express-lane alternative to foreclosure 
in the judicial system and strip borrowers of protections embedded 
in a judicial foreclosure." Thus, as an "alternative" that is "outside 
the judicial process," [§ 45-1505 alone] sets forth all of the 
requirements toforeclose on a deed of trust. 
Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted). Trotter thus distinguished In re Wilhelm and In re 
Sheridan as "federal bankruptcy cases that are inapplicable in the context of nonjudicial 
foreclosure." Id. n.3 (emphasis added). 
Not surprisingly, consistent with Trotter, numerous Idaho trial courts, both state and 
federal, have dismissed wrongful foreclosure claims virtually identical to those asserted by 
Edwards here. See, e.g., Sprouse v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. CV-11-4920, slip 
op. at 10-13 (Kootenai County Dist. Ct. April 11, 2012) (rejecting claims that (1) MERS was not 
proper beneficiary and could not assign deed of trust to foreclosing lender and (2) deed of trust 
unenforceable because the note was owned by a different party) (Attachment A); Hobson v. 
Wells Fargo Bank NA., No.1 :11-cv-00196-BLW, 2012 WL 505917, *3-5 (D. Idaho Feb. 15, 
2012) (same); Mortensen v. ACE Mortg. Funding, LLC, No. CV-OC-2011-20448, slip op. at 
*12-15 (Ada County Dist. Ct. Mar. 26, 2012) (rejecting claims that (1) foreclosing party must 
52114402.2 - 22-
show it owns the note to initiate non-judicial and (2) MERS was not proper beneficiary and thus 
could not assign deed of trust to foreclosing lender) (Attachment B); Russell v. One West Bank, 
FSB, No. 1:11-cv-00222-BLW, 2012 WL 442903, at *1-2 (D. Idaho Feb. 10,2012) (rejecting 
claim that foreclosing party must produce note to have standing to initiate non-judicial 
foreclosure); Bacon v. Countrywide Bank, No. No. 2:11-cv-00107-EJL-CWD, 2012 WL 
639521, at *9-11 (D. Idaho Feb. 8, 2012) (dismissing claim that no defendant had authority to 
foreclose because note and deed of trust were split); see also Gordon v. Fed Nat 'I Mortg. Ass 'n, 
No. CV-2011-1069, slip op. at (Bingham County Dist. Ct. Feb. 17, 2012) (rejecting argument 
that MERS is not proper beneficiary and that note and deed of trust were split rendering it 
unenforceable) (Attachment C); Washburn v. Bank of Am., NA., No. 1:11-cv-00193-EJL-CWD, 
2012 WL 139213, at *2 (D. Idaho Jan. 17,2012) (rejecting note ownership standing argument) 
As Trotter confirms, Idaho Code § 45-1505 permits a deed of trust beneficiary (i. e., 
MERS) to direct the trustee (i.e., Pioneer) to foreclose and auction the property, subject only to 
the strictures of the statute. Here, as in Trotter, the Kootenai County public land records 
irrefutably establish respondents' compliance with all statutory requirements for non-judicial 
foreclosure. First, pursuant to § 45-1505(1), the deed of trust executed by Edwards and naming 
MERS as "beneficiary," and MERS' subsequent appointment of Pioneer as successor trustee, 
were recorded in the public land records. (R.124 - Exs. A & B.) Second, as required by § 45-
1505(2), Edwards' admitted failure to make payments constitutes a default under the express 
terms of the deed of trust authorizing sale of the property. (R.124 - Ex. A.) Third, the trustee, 
Pioneer, through its attorney in fact, QLS, recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell, as 
mandated by § 45-1505(2). (R.124 - Ex. D.) Fourth, consistent with § 45-1506(2), after 
recording the Notice of Default and Election to Sell, but more than 120 days before the 
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scheduled trustee sale, Pioneer, through QLS, sent a Notice of Trustee's Sale to Edwards via 
certified or registered mail. (R.124 - Ex. C.) Fifth, personal service of the Notice of Sale was 
attempted and then posted conspicuously at the Property on three separate occasions, per the 
command of § 4S-1S06(S). (!d.) Sixth, as directed by § 4S-1S06(S), the notice of sale was 
published in a newspaper covering Kootenai County. (Id.) Finally, affidavits of mailing, posting, 
and publication of notice of sale were recorded pursuant to § 4S-1S06(6). (Id.) 
In sum, this Court's recent Trotter decision is dispositive of Edwards' appeal. The 
district court's decision below should be affirmed. 
B. MERS Is a Proper Beneficiary Under Idaho Law 
Edwards also apparently challenges MERS ability to serve as "beneficiary." Edwards 
evidently claims that only the owner of the note can serve as beneficiary. She criticizes MERS 
as a "phantom beneficiary" (Appellant's Bf. at 12), based on a "self-appointed designation" and 
"mere invocation of the term" (id. at IS), "empty words," (id. at 16), and "fabricated labels" (id 
at 30). MERS, she says, is not the "true" (id. at 22) or "actual" beneficiary (id. at 29) because 
MERS does not own the note. MERS is just a database that "tracks ownership of the lien" (id. at 
IS, 19) with no "authority to do anything" (id. at 16,28), particularly "foreclose" (id. at 16,17, 
29). Edwards' improper beneficiary theory is simply a recasting of her baseless standing or 
"show me the note" theory. Her improper beneficiary theory turns entirely upon the same 
underlying premise that only the owner of the note may foreclose. This underlying premise was 
already rejected in Trotter. See Mortensen, supra, slip op. at * 14 (reading Trotter as foreclosing 
argument that "MERS 'cannot demonstrate that it is the beneficiary as defined by statute, and as 
such, lacks the standing to assign [deed of trust]"). 
Even if Trotter were not dispositive, it is clear that MERS is a proper beneficiary. Idaho 
Code § 4S-1S02( 1) defines "Beneficiary" as "the person named or otherwise designated in a 
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trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his successor in interest, and 
who shall not be the trustee." (Emphasis added). Nothing in the statute mentions the note, much 
less requires that note owner be the beneficiary. Here, MERS is "the person named or otherwise 
designated in [Edwards'] trust deed as the person for whose benefit the trust deed is given." The 
deed of trust expressly states that "MERS is the beneficiary under this Security Instrument" 
(R.124 - Ex. A at p. 1 (emphasis added)), and that "the beneficiary of this Security Instrument is 
MERS" (id. at p. 2.) MERS serves a beneficiary and holder of record legal title to the security 
instrument in its representative agency capacity on behalf of the owner of the note. (Id. at pp. 1-
3.) The deed of trust explicitly confers upon MERS the "the right[] to exercise any or all of 
[Lender's] interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; 
and to take any action required of Lender, including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling 
this Security Instrument." (Id. at p. 3 (emphasis added).) 
"Benefit" is very broad and malleable word, see Webster's New International Dictionary 
203 (3d ed. 2002),10 and MERS clearly receives "benefit" from the trust deed even though 
MERS did not lend the money and ultimately does not have the right to receive repayment. The 
trust deed gives MERS a real "benefit" as holder of record legal title to the security instrument 
on behalf of the lender, with the delegated authority to take all necessary actions for the lender, 
including collecting payments and foreclosing. Indeed, as the beneficiary of record, MERS has 
the exclusive authority to direct the trustee to foreclose (unless and until it assigns away the deed 
of trust). As a matter of practice, MERS does not normally collect payments and no longer 
permits foreclosures in its own name (instead, MERS normally assigns the trust deed to the 
current note holder/owner or servicer who then directs the foreclosure in its name). But these 
10 Statutory construction principles permit resort to common dictionary usage to arrive at plain 
meaning of terms. See, e.g., Huyett v. Idaho State Univ., 104 P.3d 946,909 (Idaho 2004). 
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business practices do not negate the fact that MERS has these contractual rights under the deed 
of trust. 
Idaho courts court have held that MERS may serve as a proper beneficiary under a deed 
of trust. See Hobson, 2012 WL 505917, at *4-5 (dismissing claim that MERS was not a proper 
beneficiary under I.C. § 45-1502); Sprouse, supra, slip op. at 7-9 (same). This is not surprising, 
given that the designation of MERS as the deed of trust beneficiary not only satisfies the statute, 
it fully comports with established contract law principles. In Idaho, as in every jurisdiction, 
"[t]he courts, both at law and in equity, must respect the provisions of a contract lawfully agreed 
to." Howard v. Bar Bell Land & Cattle Co., 340 P.2d 103, 107 (Idaho 1959). And, as the Ninth 
Circuit recognized, plaintiffs "agreed to the terms [of trust deed] and were on notice" that MERS 
was beneficiary. Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1042. 
MERS status as beneficiary also fits with basic agency law principles. Indeed, the use of 
an agent or "nominee," which means "one designated to act for another as his representative in a 
rather limited sense," Schuh Trading Co. v. Comm'r, 95 F.2d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 1938), "has long 
been sanctioned as a legitimate practice" in real estate, where owners frequently confer rights on 
a "nominee" or "agent" for a variety of purposes, including to execute or hold security 
instruments. In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23,30 (1st Cir. 1975) (citing cases); see also In re 
Childs Co., 163 F.2d 379,382 (2d Cir. 1947); Barkhausen v. Cant'! Ill. Nat 'I Bank, 120N.E.2d 
649, 655 (Ill. 1954). The Restatement (3d) of Property (Mortgages) confirms that agents may 
enforce a mortgage on behalf of a lender, even instructing courts to "be vigorous in seeking to 
find such [an agency] relationship, since the result is otherwise likely to be a windfall for the 
mortgagor and the frustration of [the lender's] expectation of security." Id. § 5.4, cmt. e (1997); 
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see also id. § 5.4(c) ("mortgage may be enforced only by, or in behalf of, a person who is 
entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage secures") (emphasis added). 1 1 
Recognizing that MERS properly may serve as beneficiary under Idaho law, Edwards 
argues that MERS is not a proper beneficiary here because MERS is also impermissibly acting as 
trustee. (Appellant's Bf. at 31-32.) Edwards notes that "beneficiary" is defined as a person who 
"shall not be the trustee" and that "trustee" is defined as "a person to whom the legal title to real 
property is conveyed by trust deed." (Id. at 31.) She then points to the deed of trust language that 
"MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by borrower in this Security Instrument." 
(R.124 - Ex. A at p. 3.) She claims that this "legal title" language means that MERS is acting as 
trustee and therefore MERS cannot also be the beneficiary. (Appellant's Bf. at 32.) Once again, 
Edwards' argument is incorrect. The deed of trust plainly and unambiguously names Alliance 
(who has now been replaced by Pioneer) as "trustee" and provides that "Borrower irrevocably 
grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the [Property] ... " (R.124 - Ex. A at 
p. 3.) The "legal title" language relied upon by Edwards merely describes the agency 
relationship between the note owner and MERS, giving MERS legal title to the security 
instrument, not title to the real property. 
Indeed, on this grounds, Idaho trial courts have correctly rejected this same "trustee" 
argument. For example, in Payne v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. CV-2011-451, slip op. at 7-8 
(Jefferson County D. Ct. Nov. 15,2011) (Attachment D), the court held that, reading the Deed of 
Trust as a whole, "it unmistakably defines Alliance Title as the trustee, and there is no 
II See also MIL TON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON CONTRACTS & CONVEYANCES OF REAL 
PROPERTY, chapter 6, § 6: 1:5 Nominees ("[I]t is familiar practice in real estate transactions to use 
a nominee. "). 
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reasonable interpretation of the Deed of Trust that would make MERS a trustee." (Emphasis 
added). The court explained: 
[The "legal title" language in the Deed of Trust] does nothing more 
than give MERS a legal interest in the Deed of Trust as nominee 
for the lender. In other words, the Deed of Trust gives MERS, as 
nominee for the lender, power to act on behalf of the lender to 
foreclose and sell the property or cancel the Deed of Trust. Thus, 
the language referring to legal interest held by MERS defines the 
agency relationship between the lender and MERS.... Even 
considering the provision in isolation, this Court does not believe 
the Deed of Trust purported to give MERS a legal interest in real 
property .... 
Id. at 7-8 (Jefferson County D. Ct. Nov. 15,2011); accord Gordon, supra, slip op. at 15 (holding 
that deed of trust, when read as a whole, does not provide that MERS is acting as trustee, and 
selectively reading isolated language to the contrary would thwart the mutual intent of the 
parties, while allowing borrower to "shirk his responsibility"). This Court also should reject 
Edwards' meritless "trustee" argument. 
Edwards also makes the confusing argument that there was an improper "assignment of 
Deed of Trust." (Appellant's Br. at 9.) But the deed of trust has never been assigned. MERS 
has been the beneficiary since the deed of trust was first recorded in the land records. To the 
extent Edwards is really claiming that her note was transferred, that claim appears to be based on 
the mistaken assumption that her loan was transferred from Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, to 
Aurora Bank, FSB. In fact, Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, merely changed its name to Aurora 
Bank, FSB. There is no allegation or evidence that the note was transferred. 
In any event, contrary to Edwards' assertions, MERS's authority under the deed of 
trust-which expressly includes the right to foreclose or cancel the deed of trust-certainly 
includes the authority to assign its beneficiary interest if and when MERS chooses to do so. In 
Trotter, this Court declined to decide whether MERS had authority to assign the deed of trust 
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because the deed of trust was not in the appellate record. The Trotter court did, however, 
"presume that the deed of trust supports the district court's findings that MERS could assign its 
interests." 275 P.3d 857, at *6. Trotter specifically rejected that the two bankruptcy decisions 
support "the assertion that under Idaho law, MERS could not assign the deed of trust." Id; see 
also Sprouse, supra, at 8-10 (nothing under Idaho law prohibits MERS from assigning its interest 
in deed of trust to the note owner who then begins foreclosure); Hobson, 2012 WL 505917 at *4 
(MERS has authority to assign deed of trust). 
C. The Note and Deed of Trust Were Not Impermissibly Split 
In another twist on her "show me the note" premise, Edwards argues that the sale or 
securitization of her note and/or MERS' role as deed of trust beneficiary impermissibly 
"separated" the note from the deed of trust, rendering the note unsecured and the deed of trust 
"unenforceable." (Appellant's Br. at 25.) According to Edwards, the "note and deed of trust 
must be held by the same owner in order to be enforceable." (ld.) Again, this "show me the 
note" theory was rejected in, and cannot survive, Trotter. See Russell, 2012 WL 442903, at *1 
(reading Trotter as precluding claim that no party had standing to foreclosure because no party 
owned both the deed of trust and note which were split as a result of securitization). 
In any event, there was no separation between the note and the deed of trust in this case. 
As noted above, there is no evidence that Edwards' note was ever securitized or sold by the 
original lender, Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, nlk/a Aurora Bank, FSB. But even if the note was 
sold or securitized, there was no legal separation of the note and deed of trust. Edwards 
argument ignores the indisputable fact that MERS was party to the original loan transaction and 
that note and deed of trust were executed contemporaneously as part of that single transaction. 
Thus, as the Ninth Circuit recognized, the note and deed of trust were "not irreparably split" 
because at all times MERS remained the agent of the lender and its successors and assigns. 
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Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1044; accord Us. Bank v. Howie, --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 2053575, at *9 
(Kan. Ct. App. June 8, 2012) ("Because MERS was acting as an agent of [the lender], the 
Mortgage and the Note were never severed .... "). 
Numerous courts in Idaho and around the country likewise have rejected this Edwards' 
"split" argument: 
Horvath v. Bank ofN.Y., N.A., 641 F.3d 617,624 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) ("If 
[plaintiff] were correct [] that the transfer of a note splits it from the deed of trust 
[naming MERS as beneficiary], there would be little reason for notes to exist in the 
first place. One of the defining features of notes is their transferability, but on 
[plaintiffs] view, transferring a note would strip it from the security that gives it 
value and render the note largely worthless. This cannot be-and is not-the law.") 
(citations omitted). 
Commonwealth Property Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., ---
F.3d ----, 2011 WL 6739431, at *6 (lOth Cir. Dec. 23, 2011) (holding that general 
principle that security follows the debt does not "prohibit[] the original parties to the 
Note and Deed of Trust from agreeing to have someone other than the beneficial 
owner of the debt act on behalf of that owner and its successors and assigns to enforce 
rights granted in the trust deed"). 
Wade v Meridias Capital, Inc., No.2: 1O-cv-998-DS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28414, at 
*6-7 (D. Utah Mar. 17,2011) ('''split the note' theory has been heavily litigated in 
this district and in multiple other districts and has been rejected repeatedly"). 
In re MERS Litig., MOL Docket No. 09-2119-JAT, 2011 WL 4550189, at *3-4 (D. 
Ariz. Oct. 3, 2011) ("[T]he alleged falsity in this claim arises from the fundamental 
argument that the MERS recordation process splits the note from the deed of trust and 
renders the note unenforceable. However, as discussed above, this Court does not find 
legal support for the proposition that the MERS system of securitization is so 
inherently defective so as to render every MERS deed of trust completely 
unenforceable and unassignable."). 
Meyer v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:1O-CV-00632-EJL-REB, 2011 WL 4584762, at *3 
(D. Idaho Sept. 30, 2011) (collecting supporting authority and holding that "the 
securitization of the loan did not extinguish the security interest in the real property"). 
Sprouse, supra, slip op. at 1 0-13 (dismissing claim that securitization or role of MERS 
as beneficiary splits note from deed of trust rendering the deed of trust 
unenforceable ). 
For the same reasons, this Court should reject this tired "split" argument, too. 
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D. The Overwhelming Majority of Courts in Other Jurisdictions Also Have 
Rejected Edwards' Theories 
Given the dispositive force of this Court's apposite decision in Trotter, case law from 
other jurisdictions is not particularly meaningful to the resolution of this appeal. But this Court 
can take solace in that Trotter does not stand alone. The correctness in this Court's analysis is 
confirmed by the numerous decisions around the country rejecting defaulting borrower claims 
that MERS is not a proper beneficiary or that the involvement of MERS somehow destroys 
standing to foreclose or separates the note from the deed of trust rendering the note unsecured 
and the security instrument unenforceable. In addition to the cases cited in Section ILC, supra, 
the following are just examples from the growing collection of cases far too numerous to cite: 
Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1042, 1044 (affirming dismissal of claims that MERS's role as 
beneficiary was a "sham" and split the deed of trust from the note rendering the loan 
unsecured). 
Kiah v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No 11-1010 (1st Cir. Dec. 14, 2011) Gudgment 
affirming and attaching district court's order dismissing claims that MERS could not 
assign the mortgage because MERS did not have an interest in the note) (Attachment 
E). 
Ferguson v. Avelo Mortg., LLC, 195 Cal. App. 4th 1618,1626-27 (2011) (holding that 
MERS, as beneficiary under the deed of trust, was entitled to initiate foreclosure 
despite not owning the note). 
Residential Funding Co. v. Saurman, 805 N.W.2d 183 (Mich. 2011) (rejecting claim 
that MERS was not proper mortgagee because it lacked ownership interest in the 
note). 
Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 263 P.3d 
397, 402 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting theory that MERS role as beneficiary 
"splits" deed of trust from note rendering the loan unsecured). 
Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 500-501 (Minn. 
2009) (concluding that holder of record legal title to mortgage can foreclose even 
without an ownership in the note). 
Trent v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 288 F. App'x 571, 572 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that under the terms of the mortgages, MERS has the authority to initiate 
foreclosure actions). 
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Wiley v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 3:11-CV-1241-B, 2012 WL 1945614, at *4 (N.D. Tex. 
May 30, 2012) (dismissing as invalid under Texas law "show-me-the-note" and 
"split" theories challenging MERS assignment of deed of trust to servicer who then 
initiated foreclosure for note owner). 
In re MERS Litig., MOL Docket No. 09-2119-JAT, 2012 WL 1906503, at *3-4 (D. 
Ariz. May 25, 2012) ("Plaintiff does not cite to any authority in Hawaii, nor is the 
Court aware of any such authority, that requires that MERS prove 'standing,' through 
the production of a promissory note or otherwise, before it could initiate non-judicial 
foreclosure .... "). 
Hien Phan v. Bank oIN.Y., --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2012 WL 1222572, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 
10, 2012) (rejecting as a recast "show me the note theory" borrower claim that MERS 
could not assign deed of trust without establishing note owner's permission). 
Welk v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, --- F. Supp. 2d ----,2012 WL 1035433, at *4 (D. Minn. 
Mar. 29, 2012) (stating that '''show-me-the-note' argument ... has been rejected by 
every federal and state court that has considered it under Minnesota law .... "). 
In re MERS Litig., MDL Docket No. 09-2119-JAT, 2011 WL 4550189, at *3-4 (D. 
Ariz. Oct. 3, 2011) (dismissing claims that, under Arizona, California, Neveda, and 
Oregon law, MERS is not true beneficiary and thus cannot foreclose under deeds of 
trust). 
Croce v. Trinity Mortg. Assur. Corp., NO. 208CV01612 KJD PAL, 2009 WL 3172119, 
*3 (D. Nev. Sep 28, 2009) ("Plaintiffs have cited no authority that is controlling upon 
this Court that holds that MERS cannot have standing as a nominee beneficiary in 
connection with a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding under Nevada law. This Court 
has previously determined that MERS does have such standing. Courts around the 
country have held the same.) (citations omitted). 
The district court's decision below is correct and should be affirmed. 
E. Alternative Grounds, Not Relied Upon by the District Court, Provide 
Independent Bases for Affirmance 
The district court's decision below may be affirmed on any ground, not just those 
grounds relied upon by the district court in granting summary judgment to respondents. See 
Lattin v. Adams County, 236 P.3d 1257, 1264 n.7 (2010). Here, several independent grounds 
raised by respondents below, but not relied upon by the district court in dismissing Edwards' 
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complaint, provide independent, alternative grounds for affirmance of the district court's 
decision. 
1. Edwards' Claims Are Equitable and Are Barred by Her Failure to 
Allege Ability to Cure Her Default 
As respondents argued below (R.126), Edwards' claims for declaratory and injunctive 
relief to stop an allegedly wrongful foreclosure are equitable in nature, and those claims fail 
unless Edwards pleads (and ultimately proves) she can repay or at least reinstate her loan. It is 
well settled that claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are generally based in equity. See 
Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass'n, No. CV 2002 3890, 2002 WL 32129530, at *12 n.5 (Kootenai 
County Dist. Ct. Nov. 30, 2002) ("[a]n injunction is an equitable remedy issued under 
established principles that guide courts of equity") (citing Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 936 
F. Supp. 738, 742 (D. Idaho 1996)); Wood v. Yordy, No. 1:07-cv-00350-EJL, 2012 WL 
1252989, at *8 (D. Idaho Mar. 30, 2012) (noting that "declaratory judgment" is a "form[] of 
equitable relief') (citing Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948)). 
It is equally well settled that those who seek equity "must be required to do equity." 
Haener v. Albro, 249 P.2d 919, 925 (Idaho 1952). Under Idaho law, this means that a party 
cannot claim that a contract is invalid while continuing to reap the contract's benefits. See, e.g., 
id. at 260 ("Appellants ask full performance by respondents. By the same token, respondents are 
in equity entitled to full performance by appellants of all their obligations."); Quayle v. Stone, 
251 P. 630, 630 (Idaho 1926) ("[H]aving enjoyed the benefits of the lease, the tenant cannot use 
the statute to defeat the payment of the balance of the rent which he agreed to pay."). This 
equitable principle applies fully to mortgage instruments. See Shaner v. Rathdrum State Bank, 
161 P. 90, 93 (Idaho 1916) (equity requires a plaintiff to offer to satisfy the debt in exchange for 
the property); MacHold v. Farnan, 117 P. 408,410 (Idaho 1911) (same). 
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Taken together, the foregoing bedrock legal principles stand for the proposition that there 
are no "free houses" just as there are no "free lunches." In other words, a defaulting borrower 
who comes to the court in equity seeking to stop foreclosure must do equity herself by pleading 
(and ultimately proving) the ability cure the default or payback the money. See, e.g., Gordon, 
supra, slip op. at 11 (borrower's failure to to tender loan proceeds required dismissal of quiet 
title claim predicated on theory that foreclosure was wrongful because MERS was not proper 
beneficiary) (citing Trusty v. Ray, 249 P .2d 814, 817 (Idaho 1952». See also Hogan v. NW Trust 
Servs., Inc., No. 10-6028-HO, 2010 WL 1872945, at *5 (D. Or. May 7, 2010) ("plaintiffs [do 
not] deny that they are in default on their loans [and do not] offer anything to indicate that they 
were able to tender the debt in order to disrupt the non-judicial foreclosure"), aff'd, 2011 WL 
2601563, 441 F. App'x 490 (9th Cir. July 1, 2011); White v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 
No. 3:09-CV-2484-G, 2010 WL 4352711, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2010) ("to the extent 
[plaintiff! seeks equitable relief to avoid foreclosure, he cannot state a claim for such relief 
because he has not tendered the amount due on the loan"); see also Keen v. Am. Home Mortg. 
Servicing, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (plaintiff failed to allege "any facts 
supporting her ability to tender any payment" and "an immediate ability or willingness to tender 
payment"). In sum, it makes no sense to stop an allegedly wrongful foreclosure if the defaulted 
borrower cannot cure because the inability to cure means foreclosure is an unfortunate 
eventuality. 
Here, of course, Edwards has not plead (much less presented any evidence that she might 
be able to prove) that she can cure her default. On the contrary, she has lived in the Property 
since August 2009 without making so much as a single loan payment. Under these 
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circumstances, her equitable claims fail based on her own failure to do equity, which provides an 
alternative, independent grounds for affirming the district court's dismissal of her complaint. 
2. Edwards Failed to Plead Any Fraud Claim with the Requisite 
Particularity Required by Idaho R. Civ. P. 9(b) 
In her amended (and initial) complaint, Edwards asserted only two purported causes of 
action: (1) temporary and permanent injunction (Count I); and (2) declaratory judgment (Count 
II). (R.8-18; see also R.8-13.) Also woven throughout her amended complaint, however, are 
conclusory and speculative purported factual allegations of "fraud" and "fraudulent" conduct, 
apparently as supposed justification for the requested injunctive and declaratory relief. (RA-6.) 
As respondents pointed out to the district court (R.I26), Edwards' fraud allegations do not even 
satisfy the minimal notice pleading requirements of Idaho R. Civ. P. 8(a), much less Rule 9(b)'s 
heightened pleading requirement that fraud be plead with particularity. See Dengler v. Hazel 
Blessinger Family Trust, 106 P.3d 449, 453 (Idaho 2005) ("Fraud claims must be pled with 
particularity"). 
Under Idaho law, to prove fraud, a plaintiff must establish everyone of the following 
nine elements: 
"(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the 
speaker's knowledge about its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) 
his intent that it should be acted upon by the person and in the 
manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearers ignorance of its 
falsity; (7) his reliance on the [representation]; (8) his rights to rely 
thereon; (9) his consequent and proximate injury." 
Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 108 P.3d 380, 386 (Idaho 2005) (quoting Witt v. Jones, 722 P.2d 
474, 477 (Idaho 1986)). In order to satisfy Rule 9(b), "'[t]he party alleging fraud must support 
the existence of each of the elements of the cause of action for fraud by pleading with 
particularity the factual circumstances constituting fraud.'" Id. at 386 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Estes v. Barry, 967 P.2d 284, 288 (Idaho 1998)); see, e.g., Dengler, 106 P.3d at 453 
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(affirming dismissal of fraud claim because "utterly general averments" without any particular 
allegations regarding "representations, falsity, materiality, intent, reliance or injury based on 
representations" fail to satisfy Rule 9(b)); Jenkins, 108 P.3d at 386-87 (affirming dismissal for 
failure to plead fraud with particularity where complaint only "generally alleged ... several ... 
false statements"). 
Here, the amended complaint contains nothing more than conclusory and speculative 
allegations of generalized "fraud" or "fraudulent" activities of respondents. There are no 
particularized allegations whatsoever as to any, much less all nine of the elements of a fraud 
claim. The amended complaint does not even name the elements of fraud. For similar reasons, in 
Cervantes the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a borrower's analogous fraud theory. See 656 
F.3d at 1034 (noting that the borrowers' fraud allegations did not indicated that they "were 
misinformed about MERS's role as a beneficiary," that they "relied on any misrepresentations 
about MERS in deciding to enter into their home loans," or that "the designation of MERS as 
beneficiary caused them any injury"). Similarly, here, Edwards' amended complaint failed by 
wide margin to satisfy Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement, which provides independent 
grounds for affirming the district court's dismissal below. 
F. Edwards' Meritless "Bankruptcy," "Substitute Trustee," and "Insurance Set 
orr' Theories Should be Deemed Abandoned 
In her amended complaint (R.104, R.106, R.112), and in her arguments to the district 
court below, Edwards contended that the foreclosure could not go forward because: (1) her 
original lender, Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, was in bankruptcy; (2) there had been an improper 
substitution of trustee involving MERS, Alliance, and American Gold Mortgage Corporation, 
Aurora Loan Services, LLC, and Fidelity National Title Insurance Company; and (3) the loan 
was securitized and was insured against default such that the note owner was paid in full. 
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Because Edwards has not continued with these theories on appeal, they should be deemed 
abandoned. See generally State v. Prestwich, 783 P.2d 298,300 (Idaho 1989) (citations omitted) 
("This Court and the Court of Appeals have held that the failure of the appellant to include an 
issue in the statement of issues required by LA.R. 35(a)( 4) will eliminate the consideration of 
that issue in the appeal."), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (1992). 
Even if not abandoned, Edwards' bankruptcy, trustee substitution, and insurance set off 
theories are at best completely meritless, at worst blatantly frivolous, and provide no basis 
whatsoever for reversal of the district court. As the district court correctly recognized, based on 
judicial notice of public records of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District 
of New York and the Federal Reserve Board, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. filed for 
bankruptcy. (R.161; R.124 - Ex. F.) On the other hand, Edwards' lender, Lehman Brothers 
Bank, FSB, changed its name to Aurora Bank, FSB, and has never filed bankruptcy. (R.161 ; 
R.124 - Exs. G & 1.) Similarly, as the district court concluded, based on judicial notice of public 
records from Kootenai County, the alleged improper substitution of trustee related to another 
loan-Edwards' prior loan that was paid off-which has nothing to do with the loan at issue in 
this lawsuit. (R.157, 162; R. R.124 - Exs. J, K, & L.) Finally, the district court correctly 
concluded that Edwards had "failed to provide any evidence to support the[] allegations" relating 
to insurance or set off. (R.163.) In sum, Edwards' questionable theories regarding bankruptcy 
and improper trustee substitution provide absolutely no grounds for reversal of the decision of 
the district court. 
G. Edwards' (Incorrect) Position, If Accepted, Would Have a Devastating 
Impact on Idaho's Residential Mortgage Industry 
Lastly, it should not be lost on this Court that if it were to accept Edward's insupportable 
arguments that respondents lack standing to pursue non-judicial foreclosure against borrowers 
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who, like Edwards, are in undeniable and irreconcilable default, there would be adverse 
consequences for Idaho beyond just Edwards' loan. It is well documented that there are 
approximately 3,000 MERS members,12 with tens of millions of MERS' security instruments 
(mortgages and deeds of trust) nationwide currently registered on the MERS system, and more 
than half of all new residential loan originations involve MERS. See Mortg. Elec. Registration 
Sys., Inc. v. Brosnan, No. C 09-3600 SBA, 2009 WL 3647125, at * 1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2009) 
(noting that there were 60 million MERS mortgages and deeds of trust on MERS system); 
Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 491-92 (noting that approximately two-thirds of all new residential 
mortgage loans involve MERS security instruments). It is equally well known that residential 
mortgage loans are commonly sold on the secondary mortgage loan market after closing. See 
Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1038; Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490. Thus, there are undoubtedly many 
such MERS loans in Idaho. Yet, if Edwards' position regarding MERS lack of standing were 
correct, most if not all of these MERS loans in Idaho would be subject to challenge. 
Edwards not only challenges MERS authority or "standing" to foreclose, she seemingly 
challenges MERS' authority to take any action, such as assigning the deed of trust, and 
presumably even recording a reconveyance or satisfaction when the loan is paid off. If Edwards 
were correct, every time an Idaho borrower with a MERS deed of trust defaulted, the borrower 
could challenge the foreclosure for lack of standing on the grounds that the promissory note is 
unsecured and deed of trust is unenforceable because different parties hold the note and deed of 
trust. This would undoubtedly increase the number of foreclosure lawsuits currently pending 
before Idaho courts, and would likely even cause some number of performing borrowers to 
consider intentionally defaulting on their loans in hopes of avoiding altogether the obligation to 
12 See supra n.6. 
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repay the money they borrowed. County recorders would also be deluged with attempts to 
transfer beneficiary status out of the name of MERS and into the lender holding the promissory 
note. 
But that is not all. Edwards' position, if accepted, would affect subsequent bona fide 
purchasers who now own and live in a property where MERS was involved in the foreclosure or 
even a reconveyance at payoff. As to foreclosures that have already taken place, numerous 
foreclosed parties would undoubtedly commence lawsuits seeking to set aside the foreclosures. 
In such instances, it arguably would require the unwinding of the entire foreclosure process as 
well as the subsequent loan transaction between the bona fide purchasers and their lenders, and 
reverting title to the property back to someone who lost it solely because they failed to honor 
their loan obligations. Further, the tens of thousands of reconveyances and releases of lien that 
MERS has executed on behalf of lenders for borrowers who honored their obligations would be 
subject to challenge. This would include, for example, the reconveyance issued in connection 
with Edwards' prior loan with American Gold Mortgage Corporation. (D.124 - Ex. K.) Taking 
Edwards' position to its logical extreme, that reconveyance was never effective, and her prior 
loan was thus never satisfied of record. 
All of this would increase litigation and recording errors and delays, unnecessary clouds 
on title, and ultimately make residential mortgage loans more expensive and less available for 
Idaho citizens. This is not hyperbole. This Court need look no further than Michigan as a real 
world example of what would be likely to occur in Idaho if the Edwards' view were adopted 
here. In Michigan, the state's intermediate appellate court reached an anomalous conclusion that 
MERS could not foreclosure because it held no interest in the promissory note. Not surprisingly, 
the court of appeal's fundamentally incorrect decision was quickly reversed by the Michigan 
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supreme court. See Residential Funding Co. v. Saurman, 805 N.W.2d 183,183-84 (Mich. 2011). 
But for six months before that reversal, there was confusion and market illiquidity in Michigan 
(e.g., title insurers stopped insuring properties making it difficult to obtain mortgage loans),13 
and widespread litigation challenging completed foreclosures, including 11 class actions. 14 This 
Court should not allow this same scenario to play out in Idaho. As was eventually acknowledged 
in Michigan, MERS is a valid beneficiary (and mortgagee) and MERS deeds of trust (and 
mortgages) are legally enforceable. As shown above, nothing in Idaho law supports the 
Edward's position that MERS lacks standing to foreclose on behalf of the lender on whose 
behalf MERS is acting as beneficiary. To avoid the foregoing unnecessary problems in Idaho, 
the district court's decision below should be affirmed. 
IV. MERS, NOT EDWARDS, IS ENTITLED TO FEES AND COSTS 
Contrary to Edwards' assertions, MERS, not Edwards, are entitled to their fees and costs 
under I.A.R. 40 and 41. Edwards' claims lack any merit whatsoever and appear to have been 
brought without proper investigation and then continued in the face of indisputable public 
records that contradict her claims. 
J3 Cami Reister, Home sales stay steady; But just for June, closed deals were 20% lower than a 
year ago, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (July 14, 2011) (MERS' Addendum at 5); Nick Tirimaos & 
Ruth Simon, Effort on Home Loans Stalls, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 19,2011) (MERS' 
Addendum at 7.) 
14 Banacki v. One West Bank, FSB, No.ll-cv-11864, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119906, at *2 (E.D. 
Mich. Oct. 18,2011). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the district court's decision below should be affinned in all 
respects. 
Dated: July 10,2012 
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CLEKK DISTRICT COURT 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JOHN SPROUSE, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) CASE NO, CV-1l-4920 
) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
vs, ) AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS 
) MOTION TO DISMISS 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, 
Inc, (MERS) 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-------------------------) 
John Sprouse, Pro Se, Plaintiff 
Matthew McGee, MOFFATI. THOMAS. BARRETI. ROCK & FIELDS, CHTD., for 
Defendant 
1. Factual and Procedural History 
On August 25, 2006, Plaintiff John Sprouse C1Sprouse") executed a Promissory 
Note in favor of First Guaranty MOlt gage Corporation for the purchase of real property 
commonly described as 5178 East Portside Court, Post Falls, Kootenai County, Idaho 
(the "Subject Property"), The Note provided that Sprouse agreed to pay First Guaranty 
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Mortgage Corporationl as Lender, $227,950,00 plus interest for the Subject Property, 
Amended Complaint, Ex. B at p. 2. 
Also on August 25, 2006, Sprouse executed a Deed of Trust to serve as security 
for the payment obligation reflected in the Note. The Deed of Trust was recorded in the 
Kootenai County Recordees Office on August 29, 2006, as Instrument No. 2052344000. 
Amended Complaint, Ex. B. 
The Deed of Trust provided that Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. (CCMERS") was the nominee beneficiary for Lender First Guaranty and its 
successors and assigns, Id ar p. 2. The Deed of Trust also provided that if Sprouse 
breached any covenant or agreement contained in the Deed of Trust, the Propelty may be 
sold. Id. at pp. 12-13, ~~ 201 22. 
On January 4, 2011, MERS executed an Assignment of Deed of Trust, wherein 
MERS transferred all beneficial interest under the August 25,2006, Deed of Trust to U.s, 
Bank National Association as Trustee for RAMP 2006RZ5 ("U.S. Bank"). alorig with the 
Promissory Note. The Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded in the Kootenai 
County Recorder's Office on January 12, 2011, as Instrument No. 2298763000. 
Amended Complaint, Ex. A. 
On June 17) 2011, Sprouse :filed his Verified Complaint fOf Quiet Title and 
Declaratory Judgment, along with a Memorandum of Law, On July 14, 2011, MERS 
filed a Notice of Appearance. On July 15, 2011) Sprouse filed a Motion for Default 
Judgment. On July 18,201 C MERS filed its Response in Opposition to the Motion for 
Entry of Default Judgment, along with a Motion for a Motion for Definite Statement. On 
July 20, 20ll} this Court entered its Order Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Default 
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Judgment, wherein it denied Sprouse's motion finding that MERS had appeared in the 
action. 
On August 1,2011, MERS's Motion for Definite Statement came on for hearing 
and Sprouse agreed to file an Amended Complaint that comported with the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure. On August 10, 2011, Sprouse filed his Amended Verified Compliant 
for Quiet Title and Declaratory Judgment. On August 24,2011, MERS filed its Motion 
to Dismiss, pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(6), along with a Memorandum in Support. On 
October 13,2011, Sprouse filed his Response Brief.! On October 13,2011, MERS flled 
its Reply Brief. 
, 
On October 14,2011, MERS Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing and this 
COUrt raised the issue of Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon, ef al .• 2 which had recently 
been fully argued to the Idaho Supreme Court. The parties agreed to stay the proceedings 
in the instant action pending a decision in the Trotter matter, and this Court entered its 
Order for Stay of Proceedings on October 17. 2011. 
On March 30, 2012, Sprouse filed an Amended Response Brief. On April 41 
2012, MERS filed a Reply to Sprouseis Amended R£sponse Brief. On April 6; 2012, 
MERS's Motion to Dismiss came On for hearing, and this Court took the matter under 
advisement. 
It Legal Standard 
When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant t~ I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the court 
determines the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's statement of his claim. Gallagher v 
I Sprouse has attached documents to his opposition and Amended opposition briefs, which this Court has 
lli!l considered as part of its present decision. This Court is only considering the Amended Complaint in 
the matter and the two exhibits attached to the Amended Complaint that are incorporated into the pleading. 
2 TrolTerv. Bank of New York Mellon, el af., ... PJd ••• ; 2012 WL 975493 (Idaho March 23, 2012). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER Page 3 of15 
15 
Mitchell, haynes, Fr'edlarJer, Pete Nc. 754.1 
State; 141 Idaho 665; 667 i 115 P.3d 756, 758 (2005). In detelmining whether a 
complaint adequately states a cause of action, every reasonable intendment will be made 
to sustain it. Curtis v. Siebrand Bros. Circus & Carnival Co., 68 Idaho 285, 194 P,2d 
281 (1948) (citations omitted), A motion under this section admits the tl1lth of the facts 
alleged; and all intendments and inferences that reasonably may be drawn therefrom~ and 
such will be considered in light most favorable to the plaintift~ Walenta v. Mark Means 
Co., 87 Idaho 543, 394 P.2d 329 (1964). A motion to dismiss may be granted for failure 
to state a claim if it is absolutely clear that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts which 
would support any relief. Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 835 P.2d 1346 (Ct. App. 
1992). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party 
is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Sumpter v. Holland Realty, Inc., 140 
Idaho 349, 351, 93 P.3d 680, 682 (2004) (citation omitted). The only facts that a court 
may consider on a motion to dismiss for failure 'In state a claim are those appearing in the 
complaint, along with any facts that are the proper subject of judicial notice because they 
are facts of conunon knowledge which controvert avennents of the complaint, 
Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273,275,796 P.2d ISO, 152 (Ct. App. 1990). 
III. Analysis 
In his Amended Complaint, Sprouse asserts that MERS is not a lawful beneficiary 
under the Deed of Trust according to "two recent Federal rulings regarding [MERS] as 
being an invalid' party on the Deed of Trust,,3 and pursuant to 1. C. §45-1502. Amended 
Complaint at p. 2, ~ 1. Further, Sprouse alleges, 
[T]he true and beneficial owner of the promissory note that 
is associated with the Deed of Trust in this action is 
, Sprouse cites the Court to In re Wilhelm, 401 B,R. 392 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) and In re Sheridan, No. 
OS-203S1-lLM, 2009 WL 631355 (Bankr. D. Idaho Mar 12,2009). 
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unknown and deliberately obfuscated, therefore clouding 
title to the subject property, Therefore, it is the purpose of 
this Quiet Title Action to compel any and all parties with 
real interest in this subject property to present their valid 
proof of claim, else release their claims. 
Amended Complaint at p. 2, ~ 1. 
Nc, 7544 
Essentially, in the Amended Complaint, Sprouse alleges that because MERS was 
not a lawful beneficiary, it had no authority to assign its interests in the August 25,2006, 
Deed of Trust and Promissory Note to U.S. Bank. Amended Complaint at p. 6, ~ 19. 
Further, Sprouse alleges that because MERS was not a lawful beneficiary, the assignment 
of the Deed of Trust split the Promissory Note fi'om the Deed of Trust, which is 
impermissible pursuant to Carpenter v. Longan. 83 U.S. 271 (1872). Fm1her, Sprouse 
asserts that he does not know who currently owns the Promissory Note. Amended 
Complaint at p. 6. ~~ 20 -22. AJ:, such. Sprouse prays that this COUlt IIcompel [MERS] to 
identify the real owner of the promissory note '" [and] enter a declaratory judgment 
ordering the Deed of Trust to be null and void.') ld at pp. 8-9, 1132. 
A. Sprouse is Held to the Same Standards as a Licensed Attorney 
In his Amended Complaint and Response blief, Sprouse El\'gues that a pro se 
litigant should not be held to the same standard as a licensed attorney) and that a pro se 
litigant's pleadings should be liberally construed to do substantial justice, Further; 
Sprouse asSet'ts that the Court should aid a pro se litigant with amending his pleading to 
comport with the correct form. Amended Complaint at p. 3; Response to Defendant'S 
Motton to Dismiss (IT p. 2. 
In this Court's July 20, 2011, Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default 
Judgment. this Court provided that Sprouse was being held to the standards of a licensed 
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attorney pursuant to the Idaho case law on the matter. The Idaho Supreme Court has held 
that "[p]ro se litigants are not accorded any special consideration simply because they are 
representing themselves and are not excused from adhering to procedural rules." In re 
SRBA, 149 Idaho 532,237 P.3d 1 (2010). "Pro se litigants are held to the same standards 
and mles as those represented by an attorney." Trotter, 2012 WL 975493, at *3 (citation 
omitted). 
B. The Quiet Title Demand Fails to State a Claim 
MERS argues that it claims no interest in the August 25. 2006, Deed of Trust nor 
the August 25, 2006. Promissory Note. and this is evidenced by the Assignment of Deed' 
ofT11lst Therefore, no right, title or interest remains with MERS as nominee for First 
Guaranty Mortgage Corporation, its successors and assigns. Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss at pp. 2 and 4. 
Sprouse argues that the assignment was not valid because MERS was not a valid 
beneficiary under I.C. § 45-1502(1). Therefore, Sprouse argues, "it is [MERS's] 
assignment action which leaves the interest in the Deed of Trust with [MERS], creates 
the cloud on the title, and gives rise to this Quiet Title Action." Response Brief at p, 4. 
I.e, § 6-401 provides, in pertinent part, that an action for quiet title may be 
maintained in the following circumstances: 
An action may be brought by any person against another 
who elaims an estate 01' interest in real or personal propelty 
adverse to him, for the purpose of detellnining such adverse 
claim, 
Idaho case law provides that Sprouse must show that he owns the property free of 
the mOltgage in order to bring a claim to quiet title. In Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 
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219, 222, 220 PJd 575, 578 (2009)} the Idaho Supreme Court provided "to remove a 
cloud on title, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove that it has title to the subject 
pl'opeliy free nom any encumbrance," In Trusty v. Ray, 73 Idaho 232, 236, 249 P .2d 
814, 817 (1952), the Idaho Supreme Court held that a mortgagor cannot quiet title against 
a mortgagee without showing that he has paid or tendered payment of the debt. 
Since the January 12,2011, Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded, MERS, 
has not claimed any right, title or interest in the Subject Property. The Assignment shows 
that U.S. Bank now has a beneficial interest in the Subject Property. Further, Sprouse has 
failed to show that he has tendered full payment of his debt obligation in order to pl'oceed 
on his quiet title action, 
Therefore, Sprouse fails to state a claim for quiet title upon which relief may be 
granted against MERS. As such, Sprouse's request that this Court quiet title in his favor 
is denied, and MERS's Motion to Dismiss as to this claim is granted. 
C. Sprouse's Claims for Declaratory Relief Fail to State a Claim 
1. The Assignment of the Deed of Trust was Valid 
Sprouse argues that the assignment of the Deed of TlUst was not valid because 
MERS was not a valid beneficiary under I.e. § 45-1502(1), and courts within Idaho and 
across the United States are challenging MERS role as a beneficiary in a Deed of Trust. 
Response Brief at p. 4, Sprouse cites the Court to non~Idaho case law and two Idaho 
bankruptcy COUlt decisions in support of his argument. to wit: In re Wilhelm. 407 B.R. 
392 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) and In re Sheridan, No. 08-20381-TLM, 2009 WL 631355 
(BanIa-, D, Idaho Mar. 12,2009), 
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed Shl'rfdan and Wilhelm in its Trottn decision, 
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Those cases are related to standing in bankruptcy 
proceedings and whether MERS met the statutory, 
constitutional, and prudential requirements to bring a 
motion in bankruptcy court. See Sheridan. 2009 WL 
631355, at *4; Wilhelm, 407 B.R. at 398. Neither case 
supports Trotter's assertion that under Idaho law, MERS 
could not assign its interest in the deed oftl.1.lst. 
Trotter, 2012 WL 975493, at *5. 
I.e. § 45"1502(1) defines a beneficiary as ('the person named or otherwise 
designated in a tI1lst deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his 
successor in interest, and who shall not be the trustee" (emphasis added). 
The August 25, 2006, Deed of Trust provides: 
"MERS" is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a 
nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns. 
MERS is the benefIciary under this Security Instrument. 
Amended Complaint. Ex B at p. 2, ~ (E). 
TRANSFER OF RlOIDS IN THE PROPERTY 
The beneficiary of this Security Interest is MERS (solely as 
nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) 
and the successors and assigns of MERS. Amended 
Complaint, Ex. B at p. 3. 
Tills Court held in Trotter 11 Bank of New York Mellon (Kootenai County Case 
No. CV-1O-95). that MERS could assign its interest in the Deed of Trust as a nominee 
beneficiary. The Idaho Supreme Court providr,d that "[w]e therefore presume that the 
deed of trust suppOlts the district court's finding that MERS could assign its interest to 
Bank of New York ll4 Trotter, 2012 WL 975493. at *5. 
Further. this CoUrt held in Edwards v. Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 
Inc., et ai, (Kootenai County Case No. CV ~ 10-2745) that there was no statutory 
4 Neither party provided our Supreme Court with the Deed of Trust, causing the Supreme Court to presume 
that this Court's holding was not in error; however, the decision did not overrule this Court's conclusion. 
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provision in Idaho's Deed of Trust Act, I.e. § 45-1502, et seq., that prevented the 
beneficiary from assigning its interests in a Promissory Note or Deed of Trust to another 
beneficial party. Specifically, this Court held that "the Note and Deed of Trust may be 
sold One or more times without prior notice to the Borrower." Memorandum Decision 
and Order (November 16, 2010) at p. 17. 
I.C. § 45-1502(1) apparently allows for an assignment via the «(successor in 
interest" language. Further, the Deed of Trust provides that MERS may transfer its 
beneficial lights in the property. 
This Court has also reviewed two recent U.S. District Court of Idaho decisions, 
and finds them persuasive, although not binding, to wit: Russell v. OneWest Bank FSB, 
2012 WL 442903 (D, Idaho Feb. 10,2012) and Hobson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2012 
WL 505917 (D. Idaho Feb. 15, 2012). In Hobson, Chief Judge Wimnill analyzed MERS 
role as a legitimate beneficiary under the Idaho Deed of Trust Act, and concluded that 
MERS was a beneficiary for the similar reasoning that this Court proVided in its Edwards 
decision,s The Hobson COUlt cited this CoUICS Trotter and Edwards decisions as 
authority in reaching its conclusion, and provided that "[a]lthough the Trotter [the Idaho 
Supreme Cow.t's decision] court did not directly decide the issue of MERS's authority, 
the COUlt believes the Idaho Supreme Court would conclude in this case that :MERS had 
authority to assign. a beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust to Wells Fa1'go," Hobson at 
Sprouse has not cited this Court to any binding or persuasive case law that leads 
this Court to overturn its previous findings that MERS can assign its beneficial interests 
5 Hobson cited to Ralph 1'. Met Life. Mindoka County District Court Case No. CV 2010-0200 (Aug. 10, 
2011) for the proposition that MERS is merely a sham beneficiary. Sprouse also made this argument at the 
April 6, 2012, hearing. This Court, like Judge Winmill, is unconvinced that MERS is a sham beneficiary. 
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in the Deed of Trust to another entity. Therefore, this Court finds that the Assignment of 
Deed of Trust, wherein MERS assigned its beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust to U.S. 
Bank, was valid. 
2. The Note and Deed of Trust did not Split and Allegations of Unclear 
Q,wnel"ship due to SecUlitizatjon fails to State a Claim 
In his Amended Complaint, Sprouse asserts that the Deed of Trust has become 
unenforceable because the Note and Deed of Trust were bifurcated or split at the time of 
the initial loan and at the assigrunent to U.S. Bank. As such, Sprouse alleges, the Deed of 
Trust is now unenforceable and defective. Amended Complaint at p. 7, ~ 25. Sprouse 
cites this Court to Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271 (1872) for the proposition that the 
Note and the MOltgage are inseparable. 
Sprouse also alleges that the Note has now been securitized and currently owned 
by unknown shareholders, therefore, he does not know the true and beneficial owner of 
the Note that is associated with the Deed of Trust. Amended Complaint at p. 2, ~ 1; p.B, 
~ 31. 
MERS argues that Sprouse's allegations are known as the "split the note" theory, 
and that this theory has repeatedly been rejected in COlllts throughout the country. MERS 
cites the Court to In re MERS) 2011 WL 251453 (D. Ariz. Jan. 25,2011) (a multi-district 
litigation) and Wade v. Meridlas Capital, Inc., 2011 WL 997161 (D. Utah March 17, 
2011). Memorandum in Supporf af p. 6. A~ditionallYI MERS argues that Sprouse does 
not allege any facts to suggest that U.S. Bank does not own the Note, regardless of 
securitization. nor does he aJlege the he does not know to whom to make payments, or 
that he has attempted to pay his loan and payment was refused or hnpropedy credited. 
ld. afp. /0. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER Page 10 of15 
10/15 
No, 7544 
The Idaho appellate comts have not yet addressed the split the note theory; 
however, Idaho law provides for the transfer or assigmnent of loans. See I.C. & 28-3-
201. FUlther, Idaho law provides that the security follows the debt. See I.C. §§ 45-911 
and 28-9-203(g). 
The August 25. 2006, Deed of Trust specifically provides that the Note together 
with the Deed of Trust can be sold one or more times without prior notice to Sprouse. 
Amended Complaint, Ex. Bat p. 11, ~ 20. 
Sprouse heavily relies on Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall. 271. 83 U,S. 271, 274 
(1872). This Court has reviewed the case and finds that it doesn't aid Sprouse. 
Carpenter is a U.S, Supreme Court appeal from the Colorado TeLTitory. and is not 
binding on this Court. Additionally, the facts of the case concern a loan that had not yet 
matured and not a home mortgage in default as is apparently the case here. Lastly, 
numerous federal courts have reviewed Carpenter and found that it does not support a 
split the note claim, One example is in Owens v. Recontrust Co., NA, 2011 WL 3684473 
(D, Ariz. Aug. 23,2011). wherein the court provided: 
Plaintiff alternatively argues that if she signed the Deed of 
Trust on August 24, 2006, then it was not "togetherU with 
the Promissory Note that is dated August 23, 2006, which 
impelmissibly "separates" the Deed of Trust and the Note 
('pursuant to Carpenter v. Longan (1872Y'. (Doc. 1-2, p. 
1 I ,) This Court previously has rejected foreclosure 
plaintiffs' attempts to 1'ely on Carpente.r v. Longan, 16 
Wall. 271, 83 U.S. 271, 274, 21 L.Ed. 313 (l,872) for their 
"impennissible separation" theory, See, e.g., Maxa v. 
Countrywide Loans, Inc., 2010 WL 2836958 *4 (July 19, 
2010). Plaintiff's separation of the Deed of Trust and 
Promissory Note theory therefore fails to state a claim 
for relief. 
Id at *3 (emphasis added). 
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This Court therefore finds that the Note and Deed of Trust in this matter have not 
split at any time, Fmther, this Court concludes that Sprouse's allegation that the 
bifurcation has caused the Deed of Trust to become defective and unenforceable does not 
state a claim of relief, because the Idaho appellate courts have not yet ruled on the issue 
and tho fbdonu oourto thot haw uddro!)()od tho iO!luO have found rejeoted the theory. 
Although not binding on this Court, the U.S. Disu'ict COUlt of Idaho has recently 
addressed the "securltization'~ argument in Meyer v. Bank of America, N.A., 2011 WL 
4584762 (D. Idaho Sep. 30.2011), and this Court finds the Meyer decision persuasive. In 
Meyer, the court held "[t]he Court finds the securitization of the loan did not extinguish 
the security interest in the real property." ld at *3. The Meyer court then went on to cite 
to numerous other federal COurts that came to the same conclusion. 
Further, courts in Idaho~s First Judicial District, have held that securitization of a 
promissory note does not state a valid claim for relief. See McMullen v. JP Morgan 
Chase Bank, et aL, Kootenai County Case No. CVll-3431. Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting in-Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (February 6, 
2012) (wherein District Judge Benjamin Simpson held that plaintiff cited no authotity 
supporting his securitization conclusion and dismissed the securitization cause of action 
finding that "whether or not the loan was securitized does nothing to effect Plaintiff's 
obligations under the notell). 
In the present case, Sprouse has not cited this Court to any authoritY that supports 
his allegation that because the Note was securitized U.S. Bank. does not own the Note. 
The Assignment of Deed of Trust provides that MERS. as a nominee beneficiary, 
transferred its benefiCial interest in the Note and Deed of Trust to U.S. Bank Therefore, 
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the allegation that Sprouse does not know who cU11'ently O\VIlS the Note does not set forth 
a cognizable claim upon which this Court can grant relief. 
Lastly. the present lawsuit is not an action to terminate a pending foreclosure 
action. The parties have mentioned that nonMjudicial foreclosure proceedings under the 
Idaho Deed of Trust Act have begun, but Sprouse has not made any allegations that the 
non-judicial foreclosure is defective or the provisions of the Act are not being complied 
with. He has not named U.S. Bank nor the trustee as a pmty to this action. In the 
Amended Complaint, Sprouse does allege that ce11ain documents have not been filed in 
the Kootenai County Recorder's Office, but he does not explain what those documents 
are or how they ldate to a quiet title/declaratory judgment action. Further, he does not 
allege that MERS, as the previous nominee beneficiary I has anything to do with those 
documents or their alleged lack of recording. 
Therefore. this Court concludes that Sprouse's allegations that the Promissory 
Note and Deed of Trust split are not suppo11ed by the record, and even if the allegation 
was supp0l1ed, the allegation fails to establish a cogni2:able claim. Additionally. the 
securitization allegation also fails to set fo11h a valid claim. As such. Sprouse'g claims 
for declaratory judgment are dismissed. 
N. Conclusion and Order 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, it appears beyond doubt that Sprouse can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief. As such; 
MERS's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
It appears to the Court that good cause for the entry of this Order has been shown; 
now therefore, 
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IT IS ORDERED that Sprouse's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted as to all causes of action asse11ed, and this case is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice in IOto. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the lis pendens Sprouse has filed against the 
Subject Property is hereby expunged. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that MERS will prepare and submit to this Court a 
judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision and Order. 
DATED this.J.L day of April, 2012. 
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I hereby certify that on the ~ day of April 2012, a true and COllect copy of the 
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John Sprouse 
Pro Se 
1601 N. Sepulveda Blvd., #631 
Manhattan Beach, CA 90266 
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Matthew McGee 
Moffatt, Thomas. Barrett, Rock & Fields 
POBOX 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: 208-385-5384 ~f 
Clifford T. Hayes 
Clerk of the District COUll 
By /1A-t4~1~ 
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2 IN TFfE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS" 
THE 8T A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND ¥OR THE COUNTY 0 ADA 
5 ERIC MORTENSEN, 
6 
7 
<1 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
17 
HI 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Blaintiff, 
VS. 
ACE MORTGAGE FUNDING. LLC; 
STEW ART TITLE CO.; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 
SYSTEMS, INC. (MERS); 
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS 
SERVICING, LP aka BANK OF 
AMERICA CORP., N.A. aka BAC HOME 
LOAN SERVICING, LP; 
RECONTRUST; BANK OF NEW YORK 
MELLON CORP., fka BANK OF NEW 
YOHK. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-2011-20448 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
STRIKE, GRANTING REQUEST FOR 
JUDICIAL NOTICE, AND GRANTING 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
This matter comes: before the Court on (1) Defendants Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. ("MERS"). Bank of America, N.A. for itself and as successor by merger to SAC 
Horne Loans, LP, fka Countrywide Borne Loans Servicing. LP (erroneously sued as "Bank of 
America Corp., N.A.") ("BANA"), Recol1Trust C<;>mpany, N.A. (erroneously sued as 
"Reeonstrust") f'ReconTIuse'), aud The Bank of New York Menon fka The Dank of New Ymk, 
as Trustee for Certificateholders, CWABS, Inc., Asset-hacked Certificates, Series 2007-BC3 
(erroneously sued as "Bank of New York Mellon Corp., tka Bank of New York") (<<BONY") 
(collectively, '''Defendants") Motion to Dismiss; (2) Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice; and 
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(3) Plaintiff Eric Mortensen's Motion to Strike. Oral argument was heard on March 5, 2012. Eric 
Mortensen appeared pro !:ie. Amber Dina appeared on behalf of Defendants. At the conclusion of 
oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDtJRAL HISTORY 
On February 7, 2007, Plaintiff Eric Mortensen ("Mortensen" or "Plaintifr') borrowed 
$148,000 from Defendant Ace Mortgage Funding, LLC (<<Ace Mortgage") as evidenced by an 
Adjustable Rate Note ("Note") and secured by a Deed of Trust ('~DOT") on real property located 
at 549 Longford in Meridian, Idaho ("Property"). (Compl. ~I 3.1; Aff. of Amber N. Dina in Supp. 
of Req. for Judicial Notice (<<Dina Aff.") Exs. A [Note], B [DOT].) The DOT lists MERS as 
"nominee for the Lender and Lender's successors and assigns" and Defendant Stewart Title 
Company ("Stewart Title") as the Trustee. (Dina AIT. Ex. B. p 2.) On January 24, 2011. MERS 
assigned the Ueed of Trust to BONY. (Compl. Attach. 14.) BONY then appointed ReconTrust 
successor trustee. (1d. Attach. 15.) 
Plain.tiff experienced 4<a dramatic decrease in income in 200S" and tried to sell the 
Property, but could not. (lel " 3.2-33.) Plaitltiff then attempted to sell the Property via sh<:>rt 
sale, but "all offers were rejected ... by Countrywide." (ld. ru 3.4-3.6.) Plaintiff sought a loan 
modification and was offered a trial payment plan; Plaintiff does not allege that he made all of 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
the payments 'under the trial plan or that he qualified for a permanent modification. (Jd. "1 3.8-
3.10. Attach. 6.) Plaintiff failed to make the required monthly payments under the Note and 
DOT, and ReconTrust recorded a Notice of Default on January 25, 2011. (/d Attach. 72.) On 
May 19, 2011, ReconTrust issued a Notice of Trustee's Sale setting the foreclosure sale for 
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September 26, 2011. (Id. Attach. 23.) The Property was sold in October 2011 to BONY. (Dina 
AfC Ex. C [Trustee's Deed].) 
Plaintiff filed his Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages 
on October 26, 2011. In his complaint. Mortensen alleges causes of action for (1) Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty against Ace Mortgage Funding, Stewart Title Company, and Bank of America 
Home Loans; (2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty against ReconTrust and Bank of America; (3) 
Violation(s) of Truth in Lending Act~ (4) Vi.olation(s) of Deed of Trust Act; (5) Violation(s) of 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act; (6) Violation(s) of Consumer Protection Act; (7) 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (8) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; (9) 
Misrepresentation by Trustce; and (10) Violation(s) of Title 26, Subtitle-A, Chapter-I, 
Subchapter M. Part-II §§ 850-862 and Securities Fraud. 
MOTtON TO STlUKl' 
Admissibility of evidence is a matter within the Court's discretion. Burgess v. /\almon 
River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565,574.903 P.2d 730,739 (1995). To determine wheUler a 
trial court has abused its discretion, the appellate courts will consider whether the trial conrt 
"correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and ,,·,rhether it reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason." Reed v. Reed, 137 Idalio 53, 57.44 P.3d 1108, n 12 (2002). 
Plaintiff requests the Court strike the Affidavit of Amher N. Dina. Plaintiff asserts that 
Ms. Dina cannot testify in place of Defendants or on Defendants' behalf, and that the Idaho State 
Bar Code of Conduct and Code of Ethics and the America Bar Association condemn such 
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testimony in a11i.davit form when the actual Defendants are capable of submitting an afl:1davit 
themselves. The Court rejects these assertions. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike is DENIED. 
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Defendants request, pursuant to LR.C.P. 44(d), that the Court take judicial notice of the 
Note, Deed of Trust, and Trustee's Deed. These documents were provided to the COliI1 in the 
Affidavit of Amber N. Dina in Support of Request for Judicial Notice on December 22, 2011. 
Plaintiff signed the Note on February 7, 2007. Plaintiff relies on the Note in his Verified 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages. Plaintiff executed the Deed of 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
18 
19 
20 
21 
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26 
Trust, and it was recorded on February 13,2007. The Trustee's Deed was recorded on November 
1,201 L 
The Deed of Trust and Trustee's Deed arc copies of the records of the Ada County 
Recorder's Office. These are the type of documents that are not suhject to reasonable dispute and 
are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be 
readily questioned. Additiona.ily, Plaintiff relies 011 the Note for multiple claims in his complaint. 
The Court will take judicial notice of the Note. Deed of Trust, and Trustee's Deed 
pursuant to LR.E. 201. Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice is GRAl\.T'fED. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
A. Legal Standard 
1\n Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is appropriate when there 
arc no genuine issues of material fact and the case may be decided as a matter of law. Coghlan v. 
Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 P.2d 300, 310 (1999). The non-moving party 
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is entitled to have all inferences viewed in his favor and only then may the question be asked 
whether a claim for relief has been stated. ld. "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will 
ultimately prevail, but whether the party is 'entitled to offer evidence 1.0 support the claims. '" Id. 
(quoting Orthmall v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962. 895 P .2d 561, 563 (l995)). If the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts upon which the court could grant relief: the complaint should 
be dismissed. Johnson v. Boundary Sch. Dist. No. 101, 138 Idaho 331, 334, 63 P .3d 457, 460 
(2003). 
It is clear that the court may not consider evidence or facts outside the scope of the 
pleadings when determining if the petition states a claim upon which relief may be granted. The 
court, however, may consider facts that supplement those stated in the complaint, of which the 
{:ourt may properly take judicial notice. Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273. 276, 796 P.2d 150, 
153 (Ct. ApI'. 1990). Where matters outside the pleadings are submitted in support of a party's 
motion to dismiss, a court must treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment 
Id. at 273,150; Masi v. Seale. 106 Idaho 561, 562. 682 P.2d 102, 103 (1984). 
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Plaintiffs first and second causes of action allege breach of fiduciary duty against 
Defendants Ace Mortgage Funding, Stewart Title Company, Bank of Amerka Home Loans, 
ReconTrust, and Bank of America. While Plaintiff names both Bank of America Home Loans 
2G 
and Bank of America, the Court's understanding of the parties is that that the appropriate party is 
21 
22 
23 
24 
2S 
26 
Bank of America, N.A. ("BANA"). Only Defendants MERS, BANA. BONY. and ReconTrust 
havc filed a Motion to Dismiss; Ace Mortgage has not af:tpeart.'d in this suit yet, and Stewart Title 
t1led a Notice of Appearance on March 16, 2012. Therefore, tile Court will consider the breach 
of fiduciary duty claims only as against Defendants BANA and Recoll Trust. 
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"To establish a claim for breach of Hduciary duty, the plaintiff must first establish that a 
fiduciary relationship existed at fue time of the breach." Beaudoin v. Davidson Trust Co., 151 
Idaho 701, 705, 263 P.3d 755, 759 (2011). "A fiduciary relationship exists when one party is 
under a duty to act or to give advice for the benefIt of the other upon a matter within the scope of 
the relation." ld. "Such a relationship does not exist when parties are dealing with one another at 
'ann's length.'" High Valley Concrete, L.L.c. v. Sargent, 149 Idaho 423, 428, 234 P.3d 747, 752 
(2010). "Whether a fiduciary relationship exists is a question of law." Beaudoin v. Davidson 
Trusl Co., 151 Idaho at 705, 263 P.3d at 759. 
Plaintiff alleges that BANA owes him a fiduciary duty because SANA "solicited and 
intentionally induced the trust, confidence and reliance of the Plaintiffs'" and "had superiQr 
knowledge regarding the consequences of the failure to procure the original loan, as wen as the 
loan modification and delay of the sale" and that PlaintiffS relied on BANA's advice, just as 
BANA "knew or should have known Plaintiff would." (Compl. 14.3.) Plaintiff contends BANA 
"refused to cooperate with Plaintiffs efforts at a resolution to this matter," (ld. '4.4.) Plaintiff 
alleges a trustee (presumably RcconTrust) "has a fiduciary duty toward tb.e Plaintiffs to insure 
that the [DOT] does not get split fh>m the Note and pooled and securitized outside the State of 
Idaho." (ld. 1 5.1.) Plaintiff alleges ReconTrust breached that fiduciary duty "by continuing the 
sale when Plaintiff was seeking loan modification." (ld 1 5.2.) PlaintifTaUeges both BANA and 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
26 
ReconTrust breached their fiduciary duties "by failing to provide meaningful contact infonnation 
regarding who actually had the promissory note and rDOTl to prevent fue trustee's sale" and by 
"failing to enjoin the August 7, 2010~ trustee's sale despite receiving numerous telephone calls, 
e~mail and faxes ... and being served on the day of the sale with the original Complaint, Summons 
and Lis Pendent." (ld. " 5.3-5.4.) 
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ReconTrust, the successor trustee, sent the Notice of Default to PlaintifI Idaho Code § 
2 45-1504(2) states, "[ u ]pon recording the appointment of a successor trustee in each county in 
3 which the deed of trust is recorded, the successor trustee shall be vested with all powers of an 
4 original trustee," The Court interprets this to mean that all powers and all responsibilities rest 
with the successor trustee, ReconTrust. However, it is clear that to the extent any trustee owed 
6 the plaintiff a fiduciary duty, that duty only extended to the borrower's attempts to tender the 
7 
amount due to cure the default. Diamond v, Sandpoint Title Ins" Inc" 132 Idaho 145, 151, 968 
8 
P.2d 240, 250 (1998). Idaho Code § 45-1502 does not articulate a fiduciary duty owed by a 
trustee to a borrower. It is not clear to this court that the trustee has the power or duty over any 
Hl 
11 
aspect other than the trustee's sale triggered by certain contingencies, such as a default by the 
12 borrower. Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 586, 671 P.2d 104&. 1049 (1983), Indeed. other 
13 courts have held that "a trustee in a nonjudicial foreclosure is 'nol a true trustee with fiduciary 
14 duties. but rather a common agent for the trustor and beneficiary. m Gaitan v. Mortgage 
15 Electronic Registration Systems. 2009 WL 3244729 at *12 (CD. Cal. 2009) (quoting 
16 Hendrickson v. Popular Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 2009 WL 1455491, at *7 (N.D. Cal May 21, 
11 2009». 
is 
Plaintiff has not asserted that he atte.fll~'}ted to cure the default by offering a tender of 
payment, nor that he is capable of doing so. The Court is not aware of, nor has it been provided 
20 
. . 
with, any case law that provides the trustee with a fiduciary duty'to postpone or enjoin the 
21 
22 
trustee's sale without an attempt by the borrower to cure the default by tendering payment, to 
23 prevent the split ofthe deed of trust and note, or to pro vide the plaintiff v"ith the location of the 
promissory note and DOT. Because Plaintiff did not allege that he attempted to cure the default 
25 
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by paying the amount due, it cannot be said that the trustee violated a fiduciary duty to the 
plaintiff. 
Likewise, the Court is not awarc of, and has not becn presented with, allY case law 
assigning a fiduciary duty between a bank and a borrower. Generally, the relationship between a 
bank lender and a borrower is a debtor~creditor relationship, not a fiduciary relationship, Idaho 
First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 277. 824 P.2d 841, 852 (1991). The 
Idaho Supreme Court previously considered cases from other jurisdictions which held that there 
are some instances in which a fiduciary relationship may arise between a lender and borrower, 
but the Court ultimately rejected the claim of a fiduciary rdatioll!)hip. Id.; see also Black Canyon 
Racquetball Club v. First National Batik, 119 Idaho 171,804 P.2d 900 (1991). 
Additionally, the Court is not aware of, nor has it been presented witll, any case law that 
prescribes a fiduciary duty on the servicing agent. In Castaneda, the court, when referring to the 
lender, the beneficiary, and the loan servicer, stated, "'[aJbsent special circumstances a loan 
transaction is at arms-length and no duties arise li'om the loan transaction outside of those in the 
agreement." Castaneda v. Saxon Mortg. Services, Inc., 687 P.8upp.2d 1191, 1198, (E.D. Cal. 
2009) (quoting Rangel v. DB! Mortgage Co., Ltd., 2009 WL 2190210, at *3 (E.D.CaL July 21, 
2009)). Plaintiff has not alleged that any such special crrcumstrulc:es exist. BANA's role as the 
loan serviceI' does 110t irnpoStl any fiduciary duty upon it 
Plaintiff also asserts that BANA created a fiduciary duty by intentionally 'inducing the 
trust, confidence and reliance of Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that this duty was breached wIlen 
BANA retused to cooperate with Plaintiff to resolve the matter. The Court has taken judidal 
notice of the Note. The Note specifically states how much was due. when it WIl.."l due, and where 
Plaintiff was to send payment The Note addresses default. stating that upon a Notice of Default 
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the past due amount becomes due and, possibly, the entire principal remaining due. Plaintiff has 
never alleged that he offered or was able to pay the past due amount or the principal upon the 
default The Court has also taken judicial notice of the DOT. The Court does not see, nor has it 
been made aware of, any provisions in the loan docUlllents that create a tiduciary duty to the 
borro""'Cf or require that the lender must modify the loan upon default. There is no evidence that 
the servicing agent did not engage in the modification process with PlaintitI. In filet, Plaintiff 
sought a loan modification and was offered a trial payment plan, but Plaintiff chose to not make 
the payments. (CompI.~' 3.8-3.10. Attach. 6.) 
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts which give rise to a fiduciary duty owed tu him by 
10 
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Defendants or that any such duty has been breached. Plaintiff alleges nothing more than an anns-
length loan transaction and an ordinary lender-horrower relationship between himself and 
Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 
C. Violation of Truth in Lending Aet 
Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") because 
"Plaintiffs [sic] did not receive documents and disclosures: from Countrywide Horne loan, 
[BAN A] , [MERS], and [ReconTrust), as required under the Truth in Lending Act, the RESPA 
Standards," and therethre, Plaintiff is "entitled to damages: and/or rescission rights." (CompI. 1 
6.2.) In Plaintiffs response brief in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintitf also 
contends that he \vas "rushed through toe lending process, not given a signed copy by l~fl(ler of 
the Loan Note or Deed of Trust. not notified that his Loan and/or Deed. of Trus! was being placed 
in a POOling and Servicing Agreement, not clearly informe<i of the contents ofthe loan note, and 
when Plaintiff offered to make a payoff of the note by requesting it under a [QWR] the 
26 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- PAGE 9 
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Defendants refused, in writing, to provide the documents that would have allowed Plaintiff to 
settle his debt." (Pl.'s Opp. Br. 22.) 
The statute of limitations for a TILA damage claim is «within one year from the date of 
the occurrence of the violation." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(e); Shaw v. Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB, 2009 
WL 790166, at *4 (D. Idaho 2009) (stating "[t]he 'occurrence of the violation' is pre.'>umably the 
date tbe loan was finalized" and dismissing plaintiff's time-barred TILA damages claim); see 
also Monaco v. Bear Stearns Re;~id. Mortg. Corp., 554 F.Supp.2d 1034, 1039 (C.D. CaL 2008) 
(dismissing the time-barred TILA claim for damages). The limitations statute is triggered when a 
borrower enters into a loan agreement with a creditor. See e.g., KIng v. Cal., 784 F.2d 910, 9[5 
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(9th Cir. 1986). 
A TlLA rescission claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. 15 U.S.CA. § 
1635(t) ("an obligor's right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation 
of the transaction .... "). 'The statute of limitations for rescission is also triggered when the 
borrower enters into the loan agreement with the creditor. See, e.g., King, 784 F.2d at 915. 
Plaintiff obtained his loan in February 2007. (CompI. 1 3.1.) The instant action 'was not 
filed until October 26, 2011, over three years too late to assert a claim for TILA damages. 
Plaintiff's rescission claim is also barred by the applicable limitations period, which expired in 
J'cbruary 2010. Plaintiff contends the statute of limitations does not apply to his case because 
Defendants' "TlLA violations are defensive in nature to enjoin foreclosure." (ld. 16.3.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that it is generally disfavored to file a motio11 to 
dismiss OIl the groUll¢; of the statute of limitations. Singleton v. FOSler, 98 Idaho 149, 151, 559 
P.2d 765, 767 (1977). But, the concurrence in Singleton stated, "1 do not wish to be construed as 
adhering to the view that a statute of limitations can never be raised by a motion to dismiss under 
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LR.C.P. 12(b)(6)." Id There are multiple cases in which the Idaho Supreme Court has found it 
appropriate to raise the affim1ative defense of the statute of limitations in a motion to dismiss. 
The Court finds there is no ambiguity or dispute regarding when the applicable statute of 
limitations began to run, nor whether or not they have been tolled to prevent dismissal of the 
applicable claims. Plaintiff is the initiator of this cause of action. Therefore. his case is not 
~'defensive" and Defendants may raise statute of limitations issues. Plaintiff obtained his loan in 
I'ebruary of 2007. Plaintiff has asserted no alternative date a.<; the occurrence of the violation; 
therefore, the Court finds the statute of limitations began to run at the time the loan was finalized 
in 2007, and Plaintiff's TILA claim is time·barreu. 
Even if Plaintiffs TILA claim is not time-barred, Plaintiff's TILA claim fails because 
Plaintiff does not and cannot allege tender. Rescission is a party's unilateral unmaking of a 
<:ontn:l.ct and is generally a defense for a l10ndefaulting party. Black's Law Dictionary 1332 (8th 
ed. 2004). "A claim for rescission requires plaintiffs to allege they can or will tender the 
borrowed funds back to the lender;' Kamp v. Aurora Loan Services. 2009 WL 3177636 
(C.D.Cal. 2009); see }'amamoLo v. Bank ol N. }~, 329 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003) 
("rescission should be conditioned on repayment of the amounts advanced by the lender"); see 
Garza v. Am. Home Mortg .• 2009 WL 188604. at * 5 (E.D. Cal. 20(9) (dismissing TILA claim in 
light of LaHurc tu allege tender because "[r]escission is an empty remedy without [plaintiff]'s 
ability to pay back what she has received"). Plaintiff has been consistently in default; it does not 
appear he would be able to meet the tender requirement of TILA. nor has he argued such ahility, 
thus preventing rescission. 
Plaintiff's TILA claim also fails because Plaintiff has failed to allege how Defendants 
violated TILA. Tarasanla v. Homecomings Financial. LLC, 2009 WL 3055227, at * 3 (S.D. Cal. 
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2009) (TILA claim dismissed because "lpJlaintiffs do not allege which provisions of the TILA 
were violation by which [dJefcndant nor do [pJlaintiffs aUege <non~conclusory factual content' 
which is 'plausibly suggestive of a [TILA] claim entitling the plaintiffs to relief:"'). Mortensen 
only sets forth a vague, conclusory statement that he is entitled to damages and rescission under 
TILA because he '~did not receive documents and disclosures." But. Plaintiff does not plead any 
facts describing what "documents and disclosures" he believes he should have received. 
Finally, Plaintiff's TILA claim fails because he has failed to plead detrimental relianee on 
any allegedly inadequate disclosure - also a necessary element of any claim for actual damages 
based upon an aUeged TILA violation. IS U.S.C,A. § 1640(a); Gold Country Lenders v. Smith, 
289 F. 3d 1155. 1157 (9th Cit. lOGS). 
The Court finds that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts upon whieh the Court oould grant 
relief. Plainti.ff's Truth in Lending Act claim is dismissed. 
D. Violation of Deeds of Trust Act 
Plaintiff asserts that ReconTrust lacked standing to toreclose on his property. (CompI. , 
7.3.) TIle Idaho Supreme Court recently considered lItis issue. in Trmter v. Bank of New York 
Mellon et al. and ultimately rejected the contention that a party must have "standingn to initiate 
non-judicial foreclosure: 
Trotter asks the Court to find a standing requireUlcllt in lhe Act, without providing 
a textual basis or citing to controHing precedent. However, nothing in the text of 
the statute can reasonably be read to require the trustee to prove it has "standing" 
before foreclosing. Instead, the plain language of the ~1atute makes it clear that the 
trustee may foreclose on a deed of trust if it complies with the requirements 
contained within the Act. 
111e Act states that "a deed of trust executed in conformity with this act may be 
foreclosed by advertisement and sale" in accord with the procedures it describes. 
I.C. § 45-1503(1). Those procedures are set forth in I.e. § 45-1505 .... 
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Additionally, once the notice of default bas been recorded, the tmstt;c must give 
formal notice of the trustee's sale to parties specified in the statute. See I.e. § 45-
1506. These are the only requirements that precede foreclosure. We hold that, 
pursuant to I.e. § 45-1505, a trustee fIlay initiate nonjudicial foreclosure 
proceedings on a deed of trust without first proving ownership of the underlying, 
note or demonstrating that the deed of trust beneticiary has requested or 
authorized the trustee to initiatt: thuse pwct--"edings. 
The record confirms that the Appointment of Successor Trustee, Notice of 
Default, and Notice of Trustee's Sale COJillplied with the statutory requirements 
and were recorded as specified in the statute, and the district court found that the 
defendants met tbe requirements of I.C. §§ 45-1505 and 45-1506. Because there 
is no statutory requirement for the trustee to prove standing betore initiating a 
nonjudicial foreclosure on a deed of trust, we affirm the district court's order 
dismissing Trotter's claims. 
--- P.3d ---, 2012 WL 206004, at *3-4 (2012). 
Like in Trotter, the record here confirms thal the Appointment of Successor Trustee, 
Notice of Default, and Notice of Trustee's Sale complied with the statutory requirements and 
were recorded as specified in the statute. The Deed of Trust. which Plaintiff signed on February 
7, 2007, specifically authQrized Stewart Title Co. as the trustee and MERS as the nominee for the 
lender. (Dina Aft: Ex. B, p. 2.) Idaho Code § 45-1505 specifically grants the trustee the ability to 
foreclose upon a default. Idaho Code § 45-1504 specifically gives tbe trustee the ability to resign 
and be replaced and that any successor trustee shall have the powers of the original trustee. 
Plaintiff was provided notice that Stewart Title Co. had been replaced by a successor trustee in 
January 201 1 as evidenced by the Appointment of Successor Trustee. (Compl. Attach. 15.) 
ReoonTrust recorded a Notice of Default on January 25, 2011. (fd, Attach. 22.) On May 19, 
20 I 1, ReconTrust issued a Notice of Trustee's Sale setting the foreclosure sale. (ld. Attach. 23.) 
Defendants met the requirements ofI.C. §§ 45~1505 and 45-1506. Plaintiff's assertions regarding 
RcwnTruSl's standing to initiate foreclosure fail. 
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Plaintiff also alleges MERS '''cannot demonstrate that it is the beneficiary as defined by 
statute, and as such, lacks the standing to assign any of its alleged interests to the subject 
property due to the unlawful splitting of Plaintiff's wet ink note and deed of trust, and removal 
from the State of Idaho." (ld. ~ 7.2.) Plaintiff specifically agreed to MERS' role as the nominee 
for the lender in the DOT. (Dina Aff. Ex. B.) Further, Plaintiff has not provided any cont~olling 
precedent to support his asscrtion that MERS. as the lender's nominee cannot assign its interest 
in the DOT. Plaintiff discusses In re Veal at length in his opposition. But, In re Veal is a 
bankruptcy court case from Arizona and, as such. does not trump the binding Trotter decision. 
Trotter. 2012 WL 206004, at *3 n.3 (decisions relating to standing in bankruptcy proceedings are 
'~inapplicable in the context of nonjudicial foreclosure."'). 
Additionally, Plaintiff has not provided support for his assertion that both the Note and 
DOT must not be securitized. In Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans. Inc., the 9th Circuit 
Court of Appeals specifically upheld a foreclosure in which MERS was the nominee for the 
lender, regardless of whether the note was split from the deed. 656 F 3d 1034, 1044 (Qtlt Cir. 
2011). The court slateu, "[elven if we were to accept the plaintiffi' premises that MERS is a 
sham beneficiary and the note is split from the deed, we would reject the plaintiffs' conclusion 
that. as a nccessary consequence. no party has the power to foreclose." !d. "Further, even if we 
were to accept the plaintiffs' contention that MERS is a sham beneficiary and the note is split 
from the deed in the MERS system, it does not tollo\\1 that any attempt to foreclose after the 
plaintiffs defaulted on their lOaIIS is necessarily 'WTongful.·~' Jd at 1047. 
Plaintiff also claims that MERS is no longer registered in the State of Idaho and 
therefore, "is prohibited from engaging in any business practices." (Compi. '1 7..2.) According to 
I.e. § 30-1-1501(2)(g), "[c]reating or acquiring indehtedness, mortgages and security interests in 
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real or personal property" does not constitute transacting business within the state, requiring a 
certificate of authority from the Secretary of State. 
Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Deed of Trust Act. 
E. Violation(s) oJ Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
12 U.S.C. § 2605 requires that borrowers be notified if there is a change in the servicerof 
their loan. Section 2605 also requires the loan service!' to respond to borrower inquiries; § 
2605(e)(1) states: 
(A) III general 
If any servicer of a federally related mortgage loan receives a qualified written 
request from the borrower (or an agent of the borrower) jur information relating 
to the servicing of such loan, the servicer shall provide a written res.ponse 
acknowledging receipt of the correspondence within 20 days (excluding legal 
public holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays) unless the action requested is taken 
within such period. 
(B) Qualified written request 
For purposes of this subsection, a qualified written request shall b~ a written 
15 correspondence, other than notice on a payment coupon or other payment medium 
supplied by the servicer, that--
16 
l! 
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(i) includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to identify, the name and account of 
the borrower; and 
(ii) includes a statement of the reasons for the belief of the borrower. to the extent 
applicable, that the account is in error or provides sufficient detail to the servicer 
regarding other information sought by the borrower. 
'Section 2605(1)( 1) states: 
Whoever fails to comply with. any provision of this section shall be liable to the 
borrower for each such failure in the following amounts: 
(1) Individuals 
In the case of any action by an individual. an amount equal to the sum of-~ 
26 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 15 
2 
3 
5 
7 
8 
10 
12 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
(A) any actual damages to the borrower as a result of the failure; and 
(B) any additional damages, as the court may anow. in the case of a pattern or 
practi.ce of noncompliance with the requirements of this section, in an amount not 
to exceed $1,000. 
Plaintiff asserts he repeatedly contacted Defendants to obtain a loan modification, to 
validate Defendants' standing to foreclose, and to identify the physical location of the "wet ink}' 
Note and DOT, which constituted qualified written requests (QWRs) under RESPA. (See e.g., 
CompI. " 3.13, 3.14, 3.16, 3.24, 3.27, 8.2.) Plaintiff also alleges that BANA's failures 
enumerated in paragraphs 3.40 - 3.45 of the complaint constitute a violation ofRESPA. (ld. at" 
8.4.) 
Section 2605 specificaUy applies to requests for infonnation relating to loan servicing. 
Plaintiff does not assert he sent Defendants qualified written requests regarding the servicing of 
his loan or that hi~ account was in error. A qualified written request must contain an inquiry or 
request for the loan servicer relating to loan servicing. Just because Plaintiff sent a letter to the 
loan servicer does not mean the substance of his requests had anything to do with loan servicing. 
Indt;:ed, ca::;e law would indicate that correspondence requesting a loan modification does not 
itself qualify as a qualified written request under RESPA. In re Thorian. 387 B.R. 50, 70 (D. 
Idaho 2008). 
Plaintiff also fails to assert any "actual damages." He only requests the additional 
damages authorized under § 2605(£). which are intended as' punitive damages for repeated 
violations of RESPA. in addition to actual danlages. In addition, Plaintiff alleges Defendants' 
failures 'warrant iIijunctive relief against the foreclosure sale" and "any additional remedies this 
court finds equitable." (Id. 1 8.4-8.5.) But, "RESPA does not provide for injunctive relief or 
other equitable remedies." Serrano v. World Sav. Bank FSB. 2011 WL 1668631 at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
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2011) (holding that the plaintiff's claim that she is entitled to enjoin foreclosure and obtain other 
relief based on RESPA violations fails). 
Plaintiff has failed to allege a claim for relief under RESPA upon ~11ich relief may be 
granted. 
F. Violadon(s) of Consumer Protection Act 
Plaintiff's complaint claims a violation of the Idaho Consumer Prolection Act. 'Ine I CP A 
only allows recovery for 4<certain specific prohibited actions that are deemed to be unfair or 
deceptive." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 846. 243 P.3d 642t 662 (2010); see also I.e. § 
48-603(1)-(19). The statute oflimitations under this Act is two years. I.e. § 48-619. 
Plaintiff's complaint fails to state which specific prohibited unfair or deceptive practice 
Defendants engaged in. The complaint is also unclear as to when the alleged violations occurred, 
which acts were unfair and deceptive, and which of the f'Ow' defendants he believes misled or 
deceived him. In. Taylor v. McNichols, the Idaho Supreme Court found that because the plaintiff 
failed to allege which specific prohibited unfair or deceptive practices the defendants had 
engaged in, he had failed to state a claim for which reBef could be granted. 149 [d<lhu at 846, 243 
P.3d at 662. 
Furthermore. the Idaho Supreme Court has held that debts arising from the sale of goods 
and services are subject to the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. but other debts are not covered. 
In re Western Acceptance Carp.; Inc., 117 Idaho 399,401, 788 p.2i24I. 243 (l990)(statiJlg that 
"[d1ebts that do not arise out of the sale of goods and services subject to the provisions of the Act 
are not covered.") The loan transaction in question is not a debt that "arose out of the sale of 
goods or services" and is therefore not covered under the Act. 
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Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act upon which relief 
may be granted. 
G. Intentional infliction of Emotional Distress 
Plaintiff must show four elements to be able to recover for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress: (1) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be 
extreme and outrageous; (3) there must be a causal colmectioll between the wrongful conduct 
and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be severe. J:.,'vans v. Twin Falls 
CounJy, 118 Idaho 210.220, 796 P.2d 87.97 (1990). 
"Merely exercising a legal right does not satisfY the outrageousness element of an 
emotional-.distress claim. To be aetionable, the conduct must be so extreme as to "aroUse an 
average member of the community to resentment against the defendant," and "must be more than 
unreasonable, unkind, or unfair." Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 4.37,446-47, 
235 P.3d 387, 396-97 (2010) (quoting 86 C,J.S. Torts § 74 (2009». "The law intervenes only 
where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it." 
Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 741, 132 1>.Jd 1261, 1269 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Plaintiff alleges that BANA and ReconTrust's "callous attitude and clear unwillingness to 
work with [him] caused [him) significant emotional distress," (Compi. , 10.2.) Plaintiff also 
alleges that he was emotionally distressed by BANA and RecouTrust's "poor treatment of [him] 
during this difficult time" and that his distress' was manifested ~'by depression, sadness, 
:frustration, anger, affecting everyone in the family including 4 children,)' (ld. " 10.2-10.3.) 
Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim faillS bt':C3use Plaintiff has 
failed to allege what conduct Defendants engaged in that was extreme and outrageous. Plaintiff 
has only made conclusory allegations that Defendants treated him poorly, had a "callous 
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attitude," and were unwilling to work with Plaintiff. Defendants merely exercised thei~ right 
under the DOT, which Plaintiff granted, to initiate foreclosure proceedings after Plaintiff failed 
3 to make his monthly payments. (Dina Aff. Ex. B.) 
4 Additionally. while economic distress resulting in default and foreclosure would cause a 
5 borrower sadness or frustration or anger, the emotional distress alleged must be severe. The loan 
documents made clear that default would result from a failure to make the loan payments. 
7 
Plaintiff failed to make the loan payments, and default resulted. 
B 
lliaintiff has failed to allege any fnets to support his cause of action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief 
10 
may be granted. 
11 
12 
H. Negligent Infliction of EmotioBal Distress 
13 Plaintiff must show four elements to be able to recover fur negligent infliction of 
emotional distress: (1) a duty recognized by law requiring the defendant to conform to a certain 
15 standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal cormection between the conduct and 
16 the plaintiff's injury; and (4) actual loss or damage. In addition to these four elements, there must 
17 be some physical manifestation of the plaintiff's emotional injury. Johnson v. McPhee, 147 
IS 
Idaho 455, 466~ 210 P.3d 563~ 574 (Ct. App. 2{)09). "The 'physical injury' requirement is 
19 
designed to provide some guarantee of the genuineness of the claim in the face of the danger that 
20 
claims of mental hurm ",ill be falsified or imagined.'~ Czaplicki 'v, Gooding Joint School Disl. 
21 
22 
No. 231. 116 Idaho 326, 332, 775 P.2d 640,646 (1989). 
23 Plaintiff alleges Defendants' conduct was negligent "insofar as the defendants failed to 
24 take reasonable care to avoid causing Plaintiffs, a famity with children, emoti'Onal distress and 
25 anxiety." (CompI. 1 11.2.) '~While Idaho recognizes the tort of negligent infliction 'Of emotional 
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distress ... there must be a breach of a recognized legal duty in order to support a claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress." Nation v. Slate, Dept. a/Correction, 144 Idaho 177. 
191, 158 P.3d 953, 967 (2007). Additionally, <4[i]n order for a cause of action to arise in tort, 
Claimants must establish the breach of a tort duty, separate and apart from any duty allegedly 
created by the contract." Baccus v. Ameripride Serv., inc., 145 IdallO 346, 350, 179 P.3d 309, 
313 (2008). Other than asserting Defendants treated him poorly, Plaintiff has not pled any of the 
elements of a negligence claim, nor claimed Defendants had any duty to him outside of the 
contract. And, as the Court has already discussed, a lender-borrower relationship does not 
impose any duty of care upon Defendants. See (B) above. As no duty is owed, uone luts been 
breached. 
Additionally, while Plaintiff has alleged his emotional distress and anxiety is evidenced 
by "depression, sadness, frustration, anger, and time away from employment arld being \\1th. the 
family," it is unclear that Plaintiff has suffered an iJ1jury beyond the economic 10s8 of bis home. 
(Comp!. " 1 1.2- 11.3.) Plaintiff's assertion that he is «entitled to compensation because of the 
poor treatment that [he] received" does not identifY damages he supposedly incurred. (Id. 'If 11.4.) 
"Unless an exception applies, the economic loss rule prohibits recovery of purely economic 
losses in a negligence action, because there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another." 
Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, JOO, 108 P.3d 996, 1000 (2005). An exception 
applies ifthere is a "special relationship," but Plaintiff~ not asserted such a relationship exists. 
Id. at 301. Absent non-economic damages, no relief could be granted to PlaintitT under this claim 
regardless of its validity. 
Plaintiff's negligent intliction of emotional distress claim fails because he has not 
adequately pled its elements. 
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1. Misrepresentation by Trustee 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) states that claims of fraud must be pled with 
particularity. The nine clements of fraud are: 
(1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the 
speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; 
(6) the hearer's ignorance of the fulsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the 
hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury. 
Gray v. Tri-Way Canst. Services, inc., 147 Idaho 378, 3&6, 210 P.3d 63, 71 (2009) (quoting 
Glaze v. Deffenbaugh, 144 ldall0 829., 833. 172 P.3d 11 04, 1108 (2007)). The absence of anyone 
of the elements is fatal to recovery, Id. The party alleging fraud must specify the factual 
circumstances that constitute the fraud in their pleadings. Glaze v. Deffenbaugh, 144 ldal10 at 
833. 172 P.3d at 1108. 
Plaintiff aUeges Defendants "held the authority to postpone the foreclosure sale and to 
allow Plaintiff to receive a modification" and that their alleged failure to "inform the Plaintiff of 
this fact" "deprived [him 1 the chance to be qualified for HAMP'~ and constituted a 
misrepresentation. (CotnpL , 12.2,) A failure to inform cannot constitute an actiol121ble 
misrepresentation. Plaintiff also alleges the infonnation Defendants provided "was material 
because reliance on such facts would result in the wrongful foreclosure sale ofPlainfiffs~ house." 
(ld. '112.3.) Plaintiff fails to show how his lack of knowledge that Defendants could postpone the 
20 
sale was material or how that lack of knowledge caused the foreclosure. Plaintiff also fails to 
21 
22 
state how any alleged representations Defendants made were false. 
23 Plaintiff contends he "relied on the information and [he was] justified in [his] reliance 
24 because of the fiduciary relationship between" Plaintiff and Defendant. (lei 1 12.4.) Plaintiff's 
25 
26 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 21 
1 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1 
13 
15 
16 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
conclusory contention that he relied upon the lack of infonnation and that he was justified in his 
reliance is based on Plaintiirs failed claim that Defendants owe him a fiduciary duty. 
Finally, Plaintiff stutes he is "entitled to be compensated for the damages they suffered <u> 
a result of' Defendants~ conduct. (Id. , 12.5.) But, Plaintiff fails to state what injury and 
damages he incurred. Plaintiff has asserted that he could not make his loan payments and he was 
offered a triallonn modification, but failed to follow through with it. 
Plaintiff alleges no facts to suppoti the elements of a fraud claim. Because Plaintiff has 
failed to plead fraud with the requisite particularity pursuant to LR.C.P. 9(b), Plaintiffs fails to 
state a claim for misrepresentation upon whieh relief may be granted. 
J. Violation(s) of Title 26, Subtitie.-A, Chapter-I, Subchapter M, Part-U §§ 850-862 and 
Securities Fraud. 
Plaintiff claims Defendants engaged in securities fraud because (I) "the loan was sold, 
pooled and tumed into a security"; (2) "once the Note was converted into a stock, or stock 
equivalent, it is no longer a note"; and (3) securitization deprives the Note of its security "and file 
right to foreclose through the [D011 is forever gone." (Compl. " 133-13.5.) This claim fails 
because Plaintiff's loan does not fall within the protections of federal securities law. See Reves v. 
Ernst & Y Qung, 494 U.S. 56, 65. 110 S.Ct. 945, 951 (1990) (adopting Second Circuit Cuurt of 
Appeal's "family resemblance" approach whieh begins with a presumption that any note with a 
term of more than nine months .is a <tsecurity/' but in recognizing that n{)t all notes are seGurities, 
creates a list of notes that are obviously 110t securities, which includes nOles !:>ecured by a 
mortgage on a home), 
Plaintiff' s se~urities fraud claim is essential! y prernised on allegations that the 
securitization process split the note and DOT and stripped the Nole urit:::; securiLY and ownership 
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by any of the defendants. But, securitization does not invalidate the DOT or have a negative 
impact on ownership of the Note; the Note states it may be transferred without notice to the 
borrower. (Dina Afi: Exs. A, B.) 
Plaintiffs securities fraud claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike is DENIED, Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice is 
GRANTED, and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 
Dated this 
---
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIA-:;L-'D~~~n 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
DALE GORDON, an individual, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ) 
ASSOCIATION, "Fannie Mae;" IBM ) 
LENDER BUSINESS PROCESS ) 
SERVICES, INC., believed to be a foreign ) 
corporation registered in Idaho; FIRST ) 
HORIZON HOME LOANS, a Division of ) 
First Tennessee Bank, N.A.; PIONEER ) 
TITLE COMPANY OF ADA COUNTY, an) 
Idaho Corporation; ALLIANCE TITLE ) 
AND ESCROW CORP., an Idaho ) 
Corporation; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE, ) 
an Idaho Corporation; and MORTGAGE ) 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION ) 
SYSTEM, INC., ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
CASE NO. CV-2011-1069 
ORDER DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
AND DISSOLVING 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDERIINJUNCTION 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants Federal National Mortgage Association, "Fannie Mae" (hereinafter 
"FNMA"); Seterus, Inc. (fonnerly known as IBM Lender Business Process Services, 
Inc.) (hereinafter "Seterus"); and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
(hereinafter "MERS"), move to dismiss the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Dale Gordon 
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT ANI) DISSOLVING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER/INJUNCTION 
(hereinafter "Gordon"Y wherein Gordon seeks quiet title to certain real estate in Bingham 
County, Idaho. 2 Gordon objects to the Motion to Dismiss.3 FNMA, Seterus, and MERS 
also moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction issued in this matter.4 
A hearing was held on the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion to Dissolve 
Injunction on January 4,2012.5 Based upon the record, the arguments of the parties, and 
the relevant authorities, the Motion to Dismiss, considered as a motion for summary 
judgment, shall be granted. 
II. ISSUES 
By its Motion to Dismiss, FNMA, Seterus, and MERS argue that the Complaint 
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.6 Gordon maintains that the 
relevant deed of trust is illegal and unenforceable and therefore Gordon should receive 
quiet title to the real estate at issue.? 
The questions raised by the Motion to Dismiss and Gordon's Objection include: 
1. Should the Motion to Dismiss be considered as a motion for summary 
judgment? 
J See: Motion to Dismiss, Gordon v. Federal National Mortgage Association, Bingham County case no. 
CV-2011-1069 (filed December 6,2011) (hereinafter the "Motion to Dismiss"); Complaint to Quiet Title, 
Gordon v. Federal National Mortgage Association, Bingham County case no. CV-2011-1069 (filed May 
20,2011) (hereinafter the "Complaint"). 
2 See: Complflint, generally and at p.'2, , 2. . 
3 Memorandum in Objection to Dismissal & in Support of Motion for Declaratory Judgment and/or 
Summary Judgment, Gordon v. Federal National Mortgage Association, Bingham County case no. CV-
2011-1069 (filed December 28,2011) (hereinafter "Gordon's Objection"). 
4 Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction, Gordon v. Federal National Mortgage Association, Bingham 
County case no. CV-20IJ-!()69 (filed December 6, 2011) (hereinafter the "Motion to Dissolve 
Injunction"). See also: Temporary Restraining OrderlInjunction, Gordon v. Federal National Mortgage 
Association, Bingham County case no. CV-2011-1069 (filed May 23,2011) (hereinafter the "Temporary 
Restraining Order"). 
5 Minute Entry, Gordon v. Federal National Mortgage Association, Bingham County case no. CY-20J J. 
1069 (filed January 5, 2012). 
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2. Does Gordon raise a material fact issue with his allegation that the 
defendants failed to maintain and produce the original promissory note? 
3. Does Gordon raise a material issue of fact as to quiet title? 
4. Does Gordon raise a material fact issue regarding unjust enrichment? 
III. FINDINGS OF FACT 
The following facts are viewed in a light most favorable to Gordon and with all 
inferences drawn in his favor.s 
1. On December 6, 2007, Gordon, by and through Bonnie Gordon who 
signified herself as "attorney in fact," borrowed $342,900.00 from First Horizon Home 
Loans, a Division of First Tennessee Bank N.A. (hereinafter "First Horizon").9 This loan 
was memorialized in a promissory note (hereinafter the "Note"). 10 
2. Also on December 6, 2007, Gordon by and through Bonnie Gordon, 
signed a Deed of Trust (hereinafter the "Trust Deed") whereby Gordon agreed to pay the 
principal and interest due on the Note and conveyed in trust, with the power of sale, the 
real estate in issue. II 
6 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Gordon v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 
Bingham County case no. CV-2011-1069 (filed December 6, 2011) (hereinafter the "Memorandum 
Supporting Motion to Dismiss"). 
7 Gordon'S Objection, atpp. 1-2. 
8 Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 673, 183 P.3d 758, 761 (2008); Idaho Schools/or Equal Educational 
Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 578, 850 P.2d 724, 729 (1993). 
9 Complaint, at Exhibit C. , . 
10Id. 
lJ Complaint, at Exhibit D. The real estate at issue is formally described as: 
A PORTION OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF 
SECTION 23, TOWNSHlP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 34, EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN, 
BINGHAM COUNTY, IDAHO, AS FOLLOWS: 
COMMENCING AT THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER 
SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 23, AND RUNNING THENCE 
NORTH 599 FEET, THENCE WEST 2040 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 24°45' WEST 660 
FEET, THENCE EAST 1005 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 40 RODS, THENCE EAST 40 
RODS TO THE TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 40 
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3 
3. Gordon made some payments of principal and interest to the defendants. 12 
FNMA notified Gordon of Gordon's failure to pay the August 1, 2009 installment of 
principal and interest and all subsequent installments of principal and interest. 13 Gordon 
was then notified of the trustee's intent to sell the Property. 14 
4. In his Complaint, Gordon alleges that should the defendants fail to show 
that the Note has been kept by the lender and produced upon demand of the borrower, 
RODS; THENCE EAST 20 RODS; THENCE NORTH 40 RODS; THENCE WEST 20 
RODS TO THE TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE FOLLOWING: 
PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 
23, TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 34, EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN, BINGHAM 
COUNTY, IDAHO, DESCRIBED AS; 
BEGINNING AT A POINT THAT IS NORTH 890:37'56" WEST 513.63 FEET ALONG 
THE SECTION LINE AND NORTH 000 15'08" EAST 37.00 FEET TO THE NORTH 
RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE OF PARKS ROAD FROM THE SOUTH QUARTER 
CORNER OF SAID SECTION 23 AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 89°37'56" 
WEST 150.00 FEET ALONG SAID RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE; THENCE NORTH 
00°15'08" EAST 290.40 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 89°37'56" EAST 150.00 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 000 15'08" WEST 290.40 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
ALSO INCLUDED IS THE FOLLOWING: 
COMMENCING AT A POINT 23 RODS EAST OF THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF 
THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 23, 
AND RUNNING THENCE EAST 17 RODS; THENCE NORTH 40 RODS; THENCE 
WEST 23 RODS; THENCE SOUTH 20 RODS, THENCE EAST 6 RODS; THENCE 
SOUTH 20 RODS TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE FOLLOWING: 
COMMENCING AT A POINT 23 RODS EAST OF THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF 
THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 23, 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 34, EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN, BINGHAM 
COUNTY, IDAHO. AND RUNNING THENCE EAST l7 RODS, THENCE NORTH 
315 FEET; THENCE WEST 17 RODS; THENCE SOUTH 315 FEET TO THE POINT 
OF BEGINNING. (Hereinafter the "Property.") 
Complaint, at Exhibit A. 
12 Complaint, at p. 2, ~ 4 (emphasis added). 
13 Complaint, at Exhibit B. This Court notes that the property description attached to FNMA's Notice of 
Default does not match the description of the Property attached to the Trust Deed. Compare: Complaint, at 
Exhibit B, p. 2 to Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 16. 
14 Complaint, at Exhibit E. 
4 
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFf'S COMPLAINT AND DISSOLVING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER/INJUNCTION 
then this Court should declare that the defendants are not entitled to a non-judicia! 
foreclosure of the Property. 15 
5. By Count Two of his Complaint, Gordon seeks quiet title to the Property. 16 
Gordon alleged that the Trust Deed does not comply with Idaho Code § 45-1502, the 
Note and the Trust Deed are split, the Note does not comply with the Idaho Statute of 
Frauds, and title in the Property should be quieted to Gordon because the Note is 
unsecured. 17 
6. Gordon alleged in Count Three of his Complaint that he is entitled to 
damages for unjust enrichment in the event that the defendants fail to produce the original 
Note. ls He also claims that, if after discovery, defendants or their assigns cannot show 
they had the right to enforce the Note, then they should pay Gordon all sums he paid to 
them on the Note. 19 
7. On July 19, 2011, counsel for FNMA, Seterus, and MERS 
presented the original Note to Gordon's attorney. 20 Gordon's attorney took the 
opportunity to inspect the original Note and the original Trust Deed.21 
IV. APPLICABLE PRlNCIPLES OF LAW 
A. Dismissal under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
1. The standard for reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (hereinafter "Rule 12(b)(6» is the 
15 Complaint, at p. 6, ~ 25. 
16 Complaint, at p. 7. 
17 Complaint, at pp. 7-8. 
18 Complaint, at pp. 8-9. 
19 Complaint, at p. 9. 
20 Affidavit of Derrick J. O'Neill, Gordon v. Federal National Mortgage Association, Bingham County 
case no. CY -2011-1069 (filed December 6, 2011) (hereinafter the "O'Neill Affidavit"), at p. 2. 
21 Id. 
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same as the standard for adjudicating a motion for summary jUdgment.22 In other words, 
Gordon (the non-moving party) is entitled to have all inferences from the record and 
pleadings viewed in his favor and only then can the question be asked whether a claim for 
relief had been stated.23 
2. The only facts which may be considered on a motion to dismiss are those 
appearing in the Complaint, supplemented by those facts of which a court may properly 
take judicial notice. 24 
3. Dismissal of Gordon's Complaint is appropriate only if it appears beyond 
doubt that Gordon can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to 
relief.25 
4. If matters outside the pleadings are considered on a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion 
to dismiss, such motion must be treated as a motion for summary judgment and the 
proceedings thereafter must comport with the hearing and notice requirements of Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c). 26 
B. Summary Judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). 
1. A party against whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest 
on its pleadings.27 When faced with supporting affidavits or depositions, the opposing 
22 Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 667, 115 PJd 756, 758 (2005); idaho Schools/or Equal Educational 
Opportunityv. Evans, 123 Idaho 573,578,850 P.2d 724,729 (]993). 
23 Lasser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 673, 183 PJd 758,761 (2008); Idaho Schools/or Equal Educational 
Opportunity, 123 Idaho at 578, 850 P.2d at 729. 
24 Owsleyv. Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 133, 106 P.3d 455,459 (2005). 
25 Taylorv. Maile, 142 Idaho 253,257, 127PJd 156, 160(2005). 
26 Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270, 273,108 P.3d 417, 420 (Ct. App. 2005). 
27 Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 688,183 P.3d 771, 776 (2008); R.G. Nelson, A.I.A. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 
409,410,797P.2d 117, 118(1990). 
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party must show material issues of fact which preclude the issuance of summary 
judgment. 28 
2. While the moving party must prove the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact,29 the opposing party cannot simply speculate.30 A mere scintilla of evidence is 
not enough to create a genuine factual issue.31 Summary judgment is appropriate when the 
non-moving party cannot establish the essential elements of the claim.32 
3. If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions on material issues, or 
draw conflicting inferences therefrom, then a motion for summary judgment must be 
denied.33 
C. Quiet Title to Real Property. 
1. A mortgagor cannot, without paying his debt, quiet title as against the 
mortgagee. J.4 
2. According to the Idaho Supreme Court, "[t]here is no more finnly 
established rule than that the liability to pay a mortgage debt rests upon the mortgaged 
land as well as upon the mortgagor. A mortgagor carmot without paying his debt quiet 
title as against the mortgagee; and the same rule applies to the grantee of a mortgagor, 
who takes the land while it is still burdened with a lien for the security of a debt.'~35 
28 Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 919, 188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008). 
29 Watkins v. Peacock, 145 Idaho 704, 708, 184 P.3d 210,214 (2008); Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 
792, 798, 41 P.3d 220, 226 (200 I). . . 
30 Cantwell v. City o/Boise, 1461daho 127, 133, 191 P.3d 205, 211 (2008). 
31 Van v. Portneu/ Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009); West v. Sonke, 132 Idaho 
133, 138, 968 P.2d 228, 233 (J 998). 
32 Summers v. Cambridge Joint School District No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 956, 88 P.3d 772, 775 (2004); 
Dekkerv. Magic Valley Regional Medica! Center, 115 Idaho 332,333,766 P.2d 1213, 1214 (1989). 
33 Van v. Portneu/ Medical Center, 147 Idaho at 556, 212 P.3d at 986; Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 
873,204 P.3d 508, 513 (2009). 
34 Trusty v. Ray, 73 Idaho 232,236,249 P.2d 814,817 (1952) 
35 Trusty v. Ray, 173 Idaho at 236, 249 P.2d at 817 [citing: Gerken v. Davidson Grocery Co., 50 Idaho 315, 
321,296 P. 192,193 (1931)J. 
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D. Non-Judicial Foreclosure. 
1. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-1503(1), a trustee (under a trust deed) may 
pursue non-judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust, but only if the deed of trust has been 
"executed in confonnity with [the Idaho Trust Deeds Act.]" 
2. The Idaho Trust Deeds Act is codified under Idaho Code §§ 45-1502-
1515. 
E. Contract Interpretation. 
1. Trust deeds create a contractual power of sale. 36 
2. The objective in interpreting contracts is to ascertain and give effect to the 
intent of the parties.37 The intent of the parties should, if possible, be ascertained from 
the language of the documents.38 
3. A contract must be read as a whole and meaning must be given to all of its 
tenns to the extent possible.39 
4. The determination of a contract's meaning and legal effect is a question of 
law when the contract is clear and unambiguous.40 
5. Where two clauses are inconsistent and conflicting, they should be 
construed so as to give effect to the intention of the parties as gathered from the whole 
36 Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Dissolve Preliminary injunction, & 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment or Summary Judgm,ent, Carter v. IBM Lender Business Process Services, 
Inc., Bonneville County case no. CV-201 J..(j46 (filed January 12, 2012), at p. 9; Memorandum Decision 
and Order re: Motion to Dismiss, Payne v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, Jefferson County case no. CV-
20J 1-45J (filed November 15,2011), at p. 6; Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motions for Summary 
Judgment, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Robinson, Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-
2922 (filed January 12,2012), at p. 10. 
37 Twin Lakes Village Property Association v. Crowley, 124 Idaho 132, 135, 857 P.2d 61 I, 6J4 (1993) 
!;itin~: Luzar v .. Western Surety CompanJ!' 107 Idaho 693, 697, 692 P.2d 337, 341 (1984)]. .. 
TWIn Lakes VlIlage Property ASSOCiatIOn v. Crowley, 124 Idaho at 135, 857 P.2d at 614 [cltmg: Suchan 
v. Suchan, 106 Idaho 654, 660,682 P.2d 607, 613 (1984)]. 
39 Twin Lakes Village Property Association v. Crowley, 124 Idaho at 138, 857 P.2d at 617. 
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contract. 4 I "Apparently conflicting provisions must be reconciled so as to give meaning 
to both, rather than nUllifying any contractual provision, if reconciliation can be effected 
by any reasonable interpretation of the entire instrument."42 Thus, where possible, a 
construction will be placed upon ambiguous or apparently inconsistent provisions of a 
contract as will give protection to both parties, as against a construction which would 
only be in the interest of one of the parties to the contract. 43 
F. Statute of Frauds. 
The Idaho Statute of Frauds reads as follows: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a 
term not exceeding one (1) year, nor any trust or power over or concerning 
it, or in any manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a 
conveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by the party 
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.44 
G. Unjust Enrichment. 
1. The three elements of a claim for unjust enrichment are: (a) a benefit 
conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (b) appreciation by the defendant of such 
benefit; and (c) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable 
for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value 
thereof.45 
40 Twin Lakes Village Property Association v. Crowley, 124 Idaho at 135,857 P.2d at 614 [citing: Bondv. 
Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 996-7, 829 P.2d 1342, 1345-6 (1992)]. 
41 Madridv. Roth, 134 Idaho 802, 806,10 P.3d 751, 755 (Ct.App. 2000). 
42 Madridv. Roth, 134 Idaho at 806,10 P.3d at 755 [citing: 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 324 (1999)]. 
43 Madrid v. Roth, 134 Idaho at 806, IO P.3d at 755 [citing: Allen v. Ruby Co., 87 Idaho I, 1 1,389 P.2d 
581,587 (1964)]. 
44 Idaho Code § 9-503. 
45 Pines Grazing Association, Inc. v. Flying Joseph Ranch, LLC, 151 Idaho 924, _,265 P.3d 1136, 1143 
(2011). 
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2. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is not permissible where there is an 
enforceable express contract between the parties which covers the same subject matter.46 
V. ANALYIS 
A. The Motion to Dismiss shall be Treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment 
Along with the Motion to Dismiss, FNMA, Seterus, and MERS filed the Affidavit 
of Derrick 1. O'NeilJ.47 The O'Neill Affidavit attests that the original Note and the 
original Trust Deed were presented to Gordon's counsel on July 19, 2011.48 This 
evidence is beyond the parties' pleadings, and relied upon by FNMA, Seterus, and MERS 
in their effort to dismiss the Complaint. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss shall be 
considered as a motion for summary judgment. 
B. Unrebutted Evidence Disproves Count One of the Complaint. 
In his first count, Gordon argues that, if the defendants fail to produce the original 
Note and the original Trust Deed, then this Court should declare that they are not entitled 
to foreclose upon the Property.49 However, counsel for FNMA, Seterus, and MERS 
affied that he tendered the original Note and the original Trust Deed to Gordon's attorney 
for inspection. 50 Gordon did not rebut this evidence. Accordingly, Gordon has not raised 
1 a material issue of fact with regard to the original Note and the original Trust Deed, and 
Count I of the Complaint shall be adjudicated summarily in favor of the defendants. 
46 Vanderford Company, Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547,558, 165 P.3d 261,272 (2007). 
47 See: O'Neill Affidavit. 
48 O'Neill Affidavit, at p. 2. 
49 Complaint, at p. 6, ,25. 
50 O'Neill Affidavit, at p. 2. 
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C. Count Two Fails to State a Claim upon which Relief May be Granted. 
Gordon contends that the Trust Deed does not comport with the statutory 
requirements of Idaho Code § 45-1502, therefore the defendants, their assigns or 
successors, are not entitled to non-judicial foreclosure. 51 Gordon proceeds from this 
premise to declare that the defendants' failure to comply with § 45-1502 separates the 
Trust Deed and the Note, therefore foreclosure can never o ccur. 52 Gordon adds that a 
failed trust deed is not a mortgage under Idaho law and that the Note does not comply 
with the Idaho Statute of Frauds.s3 Gordon concludes that the Note is unsecured, 
therefore title to the Property should be quieted in Gordon.54 
Initially, the law does not permit Gordon to receive the relief he requests because 
he has not satisfied the tender rule. A mortgagor cannot quiet title against a mortgagee 
without paying and tendering payment for his debt.55 This is true even if the mortgage is 
unenforceable under the Idaho Statute of Frauds. 56 
Gordon does not dispute that he received $342,900.00 in loan proceeds, which 
allowed him to purchase the Property. Nor does he dispute defaulting on the loan. 
Gordon does not allege that he has paid (or is willing to pay) the amounts still owing on 
the Note. This pleading failure dispenses with Gordon's quiet title action. 57 
51 Complaint, at p. 7, ~ 24. 
52 Complaint, at pp. 7-8, ml27, 24, 25 (these are consecutive paragraphs, but apparently misnumbered). 
53 Complaint, at p. 8, "26-27. 
54 Complaint, at p. 8, , 28. 
55 Trustyv. Ray, 73 Idaho 232, 236,249 P.2d 814, 817 (1952). 
56 Trusty v. Ray,73 Idaho at 236,249 P.2d at 817. 
57 See; Washburn v. Bank of America, N.A., 2012 WL 139213, *2 (D. Idaho January 17,2012); Meyer v. 
Bank of America, N.A., 2011 WL 4584762, *3 (September 30, 2011). 
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Even if Gordon had tendered the amount owing on the Note, his Count II cause of 
action fails. To illustrate the point, each link in the chain Gordon constructs must ,be 
analyzed. 
First, Gordon takes the position that the Trust Deed names MERS as both the 
beneficiary and the legal title holder, in violation of Idaho Code § 45-1502(1). Idaho 
Code § 45-1502(1) defines the beneficiary under a trust deed as "the person named or 
otherwise designated in a trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, 
or his successor in interest, and who shall not be the trustee." A "trustee" is defmed as "a 
person to whom the legal title to real property is conveyed by trust deed, or his successor 
in interest. ,,58 
In the Trust Deed, Alliance Title & Escrow Corp. (hereinafter "Alliance Title") is 
named as the trustee.59 MERS is defined as "a separate corporation that is acting solely 
as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns. MERS is the beneficiary 
under this Security Instrument.'>60 The named lender under the Trust Deed is First 
Horizon Home Loans, a division of First Tennessee Bank N.A. (hereinafter "First 
Horizon,,).61 
Thus, at first blush, MERS is named as the beneficiary on behalf of the lender, 
First Horizon. The dispute arises under Paragraph R of the Trust Deed, which states: 
TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTY 
The beneficiary of this Security Instrument is MERS (sol~ly as nominee 
for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) and the successors and 
assigns of MERS. This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the 
repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and modifications of 
58 Idaho Code § 45-1502(4). 
59 Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 2, ~ D. 
60 Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 2, ~ E (emphasis in original). 
61 Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 1, ~ C. 
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the Note; and (ii) the perfonnance of Borrower's covenants and 
agreements under this Security Instnunent and the Note. For this purpose, 
Borrower irrevocably grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power 
of sale, the [Property] .. _. 
TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected 
on the property, and all easements, appurtenances, and fixtures now or 
hereafter a part of the property. All replacements and additions shall also 
be covered by this Security Instrument. All of the foregoing is referred to 
in this Security Instrument as the "Property." Borrower understands 
and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by 
Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with 
law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender's 
successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those 
interests, including but not limited to, the right to foreclosure and sell 
{sic] the Property; and to take any action required of Lender 
including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security 
Instrument. 62 
By use of Paragraph R's phrase "MERS holds only legal title," Gordon concludes 
that MERS is also the trustee under the Trust Deed, a position inconsistent with its status 
as the beneficiary, and prohibited by Idaho Code § 45-1502(1). 
To better understand the role of MERS in the real estate lending industry, it is 
helpful to refer to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Cervantes v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,63 wherein Circuit Judge Callahan wrote: 
MERS is a private electronic database, operated by MERSCORP, 
Inc., that tracks the transfer of the "beneficial interest" in home loans, as 
well as any changes in loan services. After a borrower takes out a home 
loan, the original lender may sell all or a portion of its beneficial interest 
in the loan and change loan servicers. The owner of the beneficial interest 
is entitled to repayment of the loan. For simplicity, we will refer to the 
owner of the beneficial interest as the "lender." The servicer of the loan 
collects payments from the borrower, sends payments to the lender, and 
handles administrative aspects of the loan. Many of the . companies that 
participate in the mortgage industry - by originating loans, buying or 
62 Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 3 (emphasis added). 
63 656 F.3d 1034 (91h Cir. 2011). 
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investing in the beneficial interest in loans, or servIcmg loans - are 
members of MERS and pay a fee to use the tracking system. 64 
When a borrower takes out a home loan, the borrower executes 
two documents in favor of the lender: (1) a promissory note to repay the 
loan, and (2) a deed of trust, or mortgage, that transfers legal title in the 
property as collateral to secure the loan in the event of default. State laws 
require the lender to record the deed in the county in which the property is 
located. Any subsequent sale or assignment of the deed must be recorded 
in the county records, as welL 
This recording process became cumbersome to the mortgage 
industry, particularly as the trading of loans increased.65 It has become 
common for original lenders to bundle the beneficial interest in individual 
loans and sell them to investors as mortgage-backed securities, which may 
themselves be traded. 66 MERS was designed to avoid the need to record 
multiple transfers of the deed by serving as the nominal record holder of 
the deed on behalf ofthe original lender and any subsequent lender. 67 
At the origination of the loan, MERS is designated in the deed of 
trust as a nominee for the lender and the lender's "successors and assigns," 
and as the deed's "beneficiary" which hold legal title to the security 
interest conveyed. If the lender sells or assigns the beneficial interest in 
the loan to another MERS member, the change is recorded only in the 
MERS database, not in county records, because MERS continues to hold 
the deed on the new lender's behalf. If the beneficial interest in the loan is 
sold to a non-MERS member, the transfer of the deed from MERS to the 
new lender is recorded in county records and the loan is no longer tracked 
in the MERS system.68 
In this action, the Trust Deed designates MERS as the beneficiary, solely as 
nominee for First Horizon, its successor and assigns. Alliance Title is named as the 
64 Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d at 1038-9 [citing: Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. 
Registration Sys., lnc., 770.N.W.2d 487,490 (Minn. 2009)]. . 
65 Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, lnc., 656 F.3d at 1038-9 [citing: Robert E. Dordan, Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), Its Recent Legal Battles, and the Chance for a Peacctful 
Existence, 12 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 177,178 (2010)]. 
66 Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d at 1039 [citing: Robert E. Dordan, Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), Its Recent Legal Battles, and the Chance for a Peaceful 
EXistence, 12 Loy. J. Pub. lnt. L. at 180; Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d at 
490. 
67 Cervantes v. CountryWide Home Loans, lnc., 656 F.3d at 1039 [citing: Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. 
Registration $ys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d at 490J. 
68 Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, lnc., 656 F.3d at 1039. 
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trustee. However, where the Trust Deed states "Borrower understands and agrees that 
MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by Borrower in this Security 
Instrument," Gordon alleges that MERS is latently designated as the trustee. 
The Trust Deed clearly identifies Alliance Title as the trustee and MERS as the 
beneficiary. In the "Transfer of Rights in the Property" section, Gordon "irrevocably 
grants and conveys to Trustee [Alliance Title], in trust, with power of sale, the 
[Property].,,69 No such granting language in the Trust Deed transfers the same interest to 
MERS, as co-trustee or otherwise. Instead, in the definitions portion of the Trust Deed, 
in bold letters, the Trust Deed designates MERS as the beneficiary. Indeed, in the same 
paragraph granting the Property in trust to Alliance Title, MERS is again named as the 
beneficiary, solely as nomine for the lender, First Horizon, and First Horizon's successors 
and assigns. The inconsistency comes with the phrase "MERS holds only legal title to 
the interests granted by Lender and Lender's successors and assigns." 
Thus, when read as a whole, and in light of the inconsistency between the 
designation of MERS as the beneficiary and the phrase "MERS holds only legal title," 
the Trust Deed must be construed such that MERS is the beneficiary and Alliance Title is 
the trustee. To hold otherwise thwarts the intention of the parties: to secure Gordon's 
loan with the Property. Moreover, to disregard two previous, unambiguous statements in 
the Trust Deed that MERS is the beneficiary, and to hold that MERS is the trustee, would 
only serve Gordon's interest. Gordon seeks to shirk his responsibility under the terms of 
the Trust Deed and the Note by raising the inconsistent language as a bar to the validity 
of the Trust Deed. Under Gordon's construction of the inconsistent clause, First 
69 Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 3. 
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Horizon's interest in the Trust Deed, which is a means of recouping its losses should 
Gordon default, would be disregarded altogether. 
In addition, our sister courts in Bonneville and Jefferson counties have held that 
the "legal title" clause is an expression of the relationship between MERS and the lender, 
which gives MERS power, if necessary to act on behalf of the lender as its 
representative. 7Q Indeed, Judge Harding opined, and this Court agrees, that the "legal 
title" clause 
... does nothing more than give MERS a legal interest in the Deed of Trust 
as nominee for the lender. In other words, the Deed of Trust gives MERS, 
as nominee of the lender, power to act on behalf of the lender to foreclose 
and sell the property or cancel the Deed of Trust. Thus, the language 
referring to a legal interest held by MERS defines an agency relationship 
between the lender and MERS regarding lender's rights under the Deed of 
Trust. Even considering the provision in isolation, this Court does not 
believe the Deed of Trust purported to give MERS a legal interest in real 
property. This Court must read the Deed of Trust as a whole. Upon doing 
so, this Court concludes the Deed of Trust unmistakably defines Alliance 
Title as the trustee, and there is no reasonable interpretation of the Deed of 
Trust that would make MERS a trustee. 7! 
Nothing in the Trust Deed grants the Property to MERS in trust. Accordingly, the 
Trust Deed does not inherently name MERS as the trustee. 
Next, Gordon alleges that the Note and the Trust Deed were split at inception 
because the lender on the Note is First Horizon, whereas the beneficiary under the terms 
70 Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction, & 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment or Summary Judgment, Carler v. IBM Lender Business Process Services, 
inc., Bonneville County case no. CV-201 J-646 (filed January 12,2012), at p. 11; Memorandum Decision 
and Order re: Motion to Dismiss, Payne v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, Jefferson County case no. CV-
2011-451 (filed November 15,2011), at p. 7; Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motions for Summary 
Judgment, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Robinson, Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-
2922 (filed January 12,2012), at p. 11. 
71 Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motion to Dismiss, Payne v. Chase Home Finance, LLC. Jefferson 
County case no. CV-201 1-451 (filed November 15,2011), at pp. 7-8. 
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of the Trust Deed is MERS.n Gordon argues that MERS "attempts to rectify the split by 
stating that it is acting in some fonn of restricted agency relationship solely as the 
nominee for the lender.'>73 
First Horizon is named as the lender under both the Note and the Trust Deed.74 
MERS is the designated beneficiary as a "nominee for Lender [First Horizon] and 
Lender's successors and assigns.'>75 Idaho Code § 45-1502(1) defines "beneficiary" as 
the person named or otherwise designated in a trust deed as the person for whose benefit 
a trust deed is given. Furthermore, the Trust Deed "secures to [First Horizon]: (i) the 
repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and modifications of the Note; and 
(ii) the performance of [Gordon's] covenants and agreements under this Security 
Instrument and the Note."76 The relevant granting language secures First Horizon's Note 
and the Gordon's repayment of the Note. 
As explained by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Cervantes v. Countrywide 
Home Loans, Inc., MERS acts as the nominal record holder of the Trust Deed on behalf 
of First Horizon and any of its successors or assigns who are also MERS members. (If 
the Note and the Trust Deed are assigned to a non-MERS member, then the transfer will 
be recorded in the Bingham County records.) First Horizon, its successors and/or 
assigns, retains the legal benefit of the Trust Deed. Thus, both the Note and the Trust 
Deed secured First Horizon's rights, and those instruments were not split as alleged by 
Gordon. 
n Complaint, at p. 7, ~ 27. 
73 Id. 
74 Complaint, at Exhibit C, p. J; and at Exhibit D, p. 1. 
75 Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 2,1 E. See also: Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 3. 
76 Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 3. 
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Idaho law allows the assignment of loans.77 When a note secured by a deed of 
trust is assigned, the deed of trust follows the note.78 The mere fact that the transfer 
occurs does not sever the note from the deed of trust.79 Gordon had neither argued nor 
demonstrated that an entity other than the Note holder holds the Trust Deed. 
Finally, Gordon argues that the Note fails to comply with the Idaho Statute of 
Frauds. SO However, the Note is not subject to the statute of frauds. It does not convey an 
interest in real property. Instead, it is a unilateral contract acknowledging the borrower's 
absolute obligation to repay loaned funds. sl 
Gordon also contends the Note was not duly executed.1!2 But Gordon does not 
deny his signature on the Note.83 As a unilateral contract, only.the obligor's (or the 
borrower's in this case) signature is necessary for enforcement.84 Furthermore, under 
Chapter 3 of Idaho's Uniform Commercial Code, a negotiable instrument only requires 
the signature of "the person undertaking to pay. »85 Gordon does not contend that the 
Note is not a negotiable instrument. 
Since Gordon has not shown that the Trust Deed fails to comply with Idaho law, 
and has not demonstrated a legal defect in the Note, Alliance Title or its successors or 
assigns may proceed with non-judicial or judicial foreclosure. Gordon fails to raise a 
material issue offact upon which relief may be granted in Count Two ofms Complaint. 
77 Idaho Code § 28-3-201. 
78 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 5.4(A) (1997) ("A transfer of an 
obligation secured by a mortgage also transfers the mortgage unless the parties to the transfer agree 
otherwise. ") 
79 In re Tucker, 441 B.R. 638 CBkrtey. W.D. Mo. 2010) at *6. 
80 Complaint, at p. 8,11 27. 
81 See: E.B.C. Trust Corp. v. JB Oxford Holdings. Inc., 2004 WL 5641999, *1 (C.D.Cal. October 26, 2004). 
82 Complaint, at p. 8,127. 
83 See: Complaint, generally and at Exhibit C. 
84 See: Forsman Real Estate Co. v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 511,515,547 P.2d 1116, J 120 (1976). 
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D. Gordon's Unjust Enrichment Claim does Not Raise a Material Issue of Fact. 
Gordon alleges, in Count Three of his Complaint, "[s]hould [FNMC] fail to 
produce the note as demanded by [Gordon] and if after further discovery any of the 
Defendants or their assigns or successors cannot properly show that they had the right to 
enforce the Note they should be required to pay over to [Gordon] any sums paid by 
[Gordon] as payments made on the Note or any payments made to such Defendants. To 
allow Defendants to retain such payments that were collected without lawful authority 
would unjustly enrich them and [Gordon] should be compensated for bestowing that 
benefit upon them."u 
As noted above, FNMC produced the Note. Gordon concedes this point, but 
argues that the defendants have failed to "prove the transaction" or otherwise show that 
they have the right to enforce the Note.87 Gordon does not dispute that he borrowed the 
money and agreed to become obligated to repay it. Nothing in this case reveals that 
multiple parties demand payment or claim to hold the Note. Gordon does not allege that 
any of his payments were not properly credited toward repayment of the Note. FNMC 
holds the Note and has produced it to Gordon. The Note is an enforceable express 
contract between Gordon and FNMC. Therefore, Gordon's unjust enrichment action fails 
to raise a material fact issue and will be dismissed. 
Since dismissal of Gordon's Complaint is appropriate under the facts and the law 
presented, the Temporary Restraining Order, entered May 23, 2011, shall be dissolved 
and shall be of no further effect as between the parties. 
85 Idaho Code § 28-3- 103 (l)(i). 
86 Complaint, at pp.8-9, ~ 25. 
87 Gordon's Objection, at p. 7. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Motion to Dismiss should be considered as a motion for summary 
judgment. 
2. Gordon does not raise a material fact issue with his allegation that the 
defendants failed to maintain and produce the original promissory note. 
3. Gordon does not raise a material issue of fact as to quiet title. 
4. Gordon does not raise a material fact issue regarding unjust enrichment. 
VII. ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, FNMA's, Seterus's, and 
MERS' Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted. Gordon's Complaint is hereby dismissed. 
Gordon shall take nothing by his lawsuit against the defendants named therein. 
The Motion, filed by FNMA, Seterus, and MERS, to Dissolve Preliminary 
I~unction is granted. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
,-n4 
DATED this 1L day of February 
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CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and correct copy of the foregoing Order 
Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint and Dissolving Temporary Restraining 
Order/Injunction was s~rved on the parties listed. b~low ?y ,r$tclass mail with prepaid 
postage and/or hand dehvered andlor sent by facsImIle thIS / day of February 2012, 
to; 
Rocky L. Wixom, Esq. ~ 
Wixom Law Office us M . 
.. all 
P.O. Box 51334 
o Courthouse Box o Facsimile 
Idaho Falls, ill 83405 
Lance E. Olsen, Esq. 
Derrick J. O'Neill, Esq. ;:lu.s. Mail 
ROUrn CRABTREE OLSEN, PS 
o Courthouse Box o Facsimile 
300 Main Street, Suite 150 
Boise, ID 83702 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
JOSHUA R. PAYNE and CARL J. P A 'r'1~E, ) 
a married couple, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC, believed 
to be a foreign Corporation registered in 
Idaho; NORTHWEST TRUSTEE 
SERVICES, INC., an Idaho Corporation; 
ALLIANCE TITLE AND ESCROW 
CORP., an Idaho Corporation; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE, an Idaho Corporation; 
and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRA nON SYSTEM, INC. 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV -2011-451 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On August 19,2008, Plaintiffs executed a promissory note (hereafter, "Note") in fa¥or of 
CCSF LLC (hereafter, "CCSF") in exchange for a loan in the amount of $202,040.00. Plaintiffs 
concurrently executed a deed of trust (hereafter, "Deed of Trust") to secure repayment of the 
Note. The Deed of Trust lists Plaintiffs as "Borrower," CCSF as "Lender," Alliance Title as 
"Trustee," and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (hereafter, "MERS") as "[t)he 
beneficiary ... (solely as nominee for [CCSF and [CCSF's] successors and assigns)." On 
August 26, 2008, the Deed of Trust was recorded 'against the property that Plaintiffs purchased 
with the loan money. 
In March 20 I 0, Plaintiffs stopped making payments on the Note. On December 29, 
2010, MERS assigned all beneficial interest under the Deed of Trust to Chase Home Finance 
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LLC (hereafter, "Chase"). Also on December 29,2010, Chase appointed a successor trustee, 
replacing Alliance Title with Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. (hereafter, "NTS"). 
NTS recorded a notice of default on December 30, 20 I 0, declaring Plaintiffs had failed to 
make any payments on the Note since before March 2010. Plaintiffs currently maintain 
possession ofthe property and have not made any payments for approximately eighteen months. 
In January 2011, Chase caused NTS to post and publish notice ofa trustee's sale ofthe 
property that would occur on May 16,2011. 
Plaintiffs filed the complaint to quiet title in this action on May 13, 20 II. That same day, 
this Court entered a temporary restraining order (hereafter, "TRO"). On May 23,2011, this 
Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, based in part on Chase's agreement to 
voluntarily postpone the trustee's sale of the property during the pendency of this action. 
On September 1,2011, Chase, MERS, and First American Title and Escrow Corporation 
(hereafter collectively, "Defendants") jointly filed the motion to dismiss that is now before this 
Court. On September 12,2011, NTS also filed a motion to dismiss. On October 17, 20 11, 
Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss. Defendants filed a reply 
brief on October 20, 20 II. This Court heard oral argmnent regarding the matter on October 24, 
2011. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
A court may grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings when there are no material 
issues of fact or law. Davenport v. Bur.ke, 27 Idaho 464, 149 P. 5 j 1 (1915). A court may grant a' 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim "when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of[theJ claim which would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief." 
LR.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
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The non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences viewed in his or her favor. Miles 
v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989). Yet, the non-moving party's 
case must be anchored in something more than speculation. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal 
Company, 92 Idaho 865,452 P.2d 362 (1969). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a 
right to relief above the speculative level." Williams ex rei. Tabiu v. Gerber Products Co., 523 
F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. 
Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 927 (2007). The allegations must be more "than labels and conclusions, 
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic, 550 
U.S. at 555. 
A claim has facial plausibility only when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. 
Id. at 556. It asks for more than sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. 
Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops 
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Jd. at 557. The 
United States Supreme Court explained the analysis a court must take when considering a motion 
for jUdgment on the pleadings: 
Two working principles underlie [our decision in] Twombly. First, the tenet that a 
court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare 
recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements. 
Second, determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context-
specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common 
sense. A court considering a motion to dismiss may begin by identifying 
allegations that, because they are mere conclusions, are not entitled to the 
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the complaint's 
framework, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-
pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 
detennine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1940, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). 
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III. DISCUSSION 
In this quiet title action, Plaintiffs intend to prove the invalidity of both the Note and the 
Deed of Trust. Defendants assert Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which reI ief can be 
granted. 
A. Promissory Note 
1. Statute of Frauds 
Plaintiffs assert the Note is invalid because it does not comply with the statute of frauds. 
Defendants assert the Note is not subject to the statute of frauds because it is a negotiable 
instrument and not a real-estate sales contract. 
Idaho Code § 9-503, Idaho's codification of the statute of frauds for real estate transactions, 
states: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not 
exceeding one (1) year, nor any trust or power over or concerning it, or in any 
manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or 
declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other instrument 
in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or 
declaring the same, or by his lavvful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
While this action involves an interest in property, the Note itself is not an instrument of 
conveyance. As a result, this Court concludes the Note is not subject to the statute of frauds. 
A promissory note is a unilateral contract acknowledging the borrower's absolute 
obligation to repay loaned funds. See E.B.C. Trust Corp. v. JB Oxford Holdings, Inc., 2004 WL 
5641999, at * 1 (C:D. Cal. Oct. 26,2004). Only the obligor's signature is necessary for 
enforcement of a unilateral contract. See Forsman Real Estate Co. v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 511, 515 
547 P.2d 1116, 1120 (1976). 
In this case, Plaintiffs concede they signed the Note. This Court concludes the Note is a 
unilateral contract bearing the obligors signature, and as such, it is enforceable. Moreover, 
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Plaintiffs have not contested the Note's qualification as a negotiable instrument. Pursuant to 
Chapter 3 of Idaho's Uniform Commercial Code, a negotiable instrument only requires the 
signature of "the person undertaking to pay." I.e. § 28-3-103(1)(i). 
This Court concludes Plaintiffs' statute of frauds argument does not present a viable 
means of sustaining their cause of action. 
2. "Wet Ink" Original 
Plaintiffs assert Defendants cannot proceed with foreclosure without first proving 
enforceability of the note, and Defendants cannot enforce the note unless they present the "wet 
ink" original version of it. 
Defendants assert that production of the original note is not required to proceed in 
foreclosure. 
Plaintiffs cite Nielson v. Westrom, 46 Idaho 686, 270 P. 1054 (1928) for the proposition 
that "payment to a person who is not in possession of the paper is wholly at the risk of the 
payor." Regardless of that rule, the issue in this case is not whether Defendants are actually in 
possession of the original note. The issue, rather, is whether Defendants can proceed in 
foreclosure without producing the original note. To answer that, this Court must consider the 
statutory requirements for non-judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust. Those requirements are set 
out in Idaho Code §§ 45-1505 and 45- I 506. This Court has conducted a thorough review of 
those statutes and concludes there is no requirement that the original note be produced prior 'to 
foreclosure. Furthennore, other courts have held that "production of the note is not required to 
proceed in foreclosure." Tang v. California Reconveyance Co., 2011 WL 2581416, at * 5 (ND. 
Cal. 2011); see also Roque v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 2010 WL 546896 (N.D.Cal. 2010). 
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This Court concludes Plaintiffs' "wet ink" argument does not present a viable means of 
sustaining Plaintiffs' cause of action in this case. 
B. Deed of Trust 
Plaintiffs assert the Deed of Trust is void because it purports to make MERS both a 
beneficiary and a trustee in violation of the Idaho Trust Deeds Act. 
Defendants assert the Deed of Trust is valid and enforceable because, when read as a 
whole, the Deed of Trust does not assign an impermissible dual role to MERS. 
Compared to mortgage requirements, the Deed of Trust Procedures 
authorized by statute make it far easier for lenders to forfeit the borrower's 
interest in the real estate securing a loan, and also abrogate the right of 
redemption after sale guaranteed under a mortgage foreclosure. [Citation 
omitted.) A mortgage generally may be foreclosed only by filing a civil action 
while, under a Deed of Trust, the trustee holds a power of sale permitting him to 
sell the property out of court with no necessity of judicial action. The Deed of 
Trust statutes thus strip borrowers of many of the protections available under a 
mortgage. Therefore, lenders must strictly comply with the Deed of Trust 
statutes, and the statutes and Deeds of Trust must be strictly construed in favor of 
the borrower. 
Security Pacific Finance Corp. v. Bishop, 109 Idaho 25, 28,704 P.2d 357, 360 (Ct. App. 1985). 
A deed of trust creates a contractual power of sale, and like other contracts, is ambiguous 
if it is "reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 
293,612 P.2d 135, 136 (1980). The construction of an ambiguous instrument is a question of 
fact to be resolved by the jury in this case. The court must construe the instrument "as a whole 
and consider it in its entirety to determine whether it is reasonably subject to conflicting 
interpretations." Murr v. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 781, 747 P.2d 1302, 1310(1987). 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-1503, the trustee of a deed of trust may pursue non-judicial 
foreclosure only if the deed of trust has been "executed in conformity with the Idaho Trust Deeds 
Act." That Act defines "beneficiary" as "the person named or otherwise designated in a trust 
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deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his successor in interest, and v,:ho 
shall not be the trustee." I.C. § 45-1502. The parties agree the Deed of Trust designates MERS 
as the beneficiary. The parties dispute, however, whether the Deed of Trust also designates 
MERS as a trustee. "Trustee" is defmed as "a person to whom the legal title to real property is 
conveyed by trust deed, or his successor in interest." I.e. § 45-1502(4). 
Although for practical purposes a deed of trust is only a mortgage with 
power of sale, title to the real estate does pass for the purpose of the trust. Long v. 
Williams, 105 Idaho 585,587-88,671 P.2d 1048,1050-51 (1983). Legal title to 
the property is conveyed by the deed of trust to the trustee. I.e. § 45-1502(4). 
Defendant A v. Idaho State Bar, 132 Idaho 662, 665, 978 P.2d 222, 225 (1999). 
In this case, Page 1 of the Deed of Trust unambiguously designates Alliance Title as 
"Trustee." The Deed of Trust also states, 
Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests 
granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with 
law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and 
assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not 
limited to, the right to foreclose and sel1 the Property; and to take any action 
required of Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this 
Security Instrument. 
Deed of Trust at 3. 
Plaintiffs assert the foregoing language "inherently defines MERS as a trustee." 
Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition at 12. The issue is whether the foregoing provision purports to 
give MERS a legal interest in the real property or in something else. This Court believes the 
language does nothing more than give MERS a legal interest in the Deed of Trust as nominee for 
the lender. In other words, the Deed of Trust gives MERS, as nominee ofthe lender, power to 
act on behalf of the lender to foreclose and sel1 the property or cancel the Deed of Trust. Thus 
the language referring to a legal interest held by MERS defines an agency relationship between 
the lender and MERS regarding lender's rights under the Deed of Trust. Even considering the 
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provision in isolation, this Court does not believe the Deed of Trust purported to give MERS a 
legal interest in real property. This Court must read the Deed of Trust as a whole. Upon dGing 
so, this Court concludes the Deed of Trust unmistakably defines Alliance Title as the trustee, and 
there is no reasonable interpretation of the Deed of Trust that would make MERS a trustee. 
This Court concludes Plaintiffs have failed to present law and facts sufficient to maintain 
their argument that the deed of trust is void. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
In addition to the conclusions reached above, this Court notes that Plaintiffs have never 
presented any argument that they are not in default, that they made payments that were not 
credited, that the amount owed is inaccurate, or any other cognizable legal claim. Plaintiffs 
admit they have not made loan payments for approximately eighteen months, and they have not 
asserted they are currently able to afford their loan. 
It appears beyond doubt that Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim 
that would entitle them to relief, and there exist no triable issues of material fact that preclude 
this Court fonn granting Defendants' motion for dismissal. 
It appears to the Court that good cause for the entry of this Order has been shown; now 
therefore, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that: 
Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to all 
causes of action asserted, and there are no genuine issues of material fact existing. For these 
reasons, this case is dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants prepare and submit to this Court a 
judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision and Order. 
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f1. DATED this ___ --_ day of November 20 11. 
~o<~, 
DON lIA~ING ~ 
Senior District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
\ (../ 
r hereby certify that on this _ \ ~ day of November 2011, I did send a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by 
causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Rocky L. Wixom 
WIXOM LA W OFFICE 
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Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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877 Main Street, Suit 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bormeville County, Idaho 
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